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PREFA C E
During the past few years there has been a growing interest in the secondary
use of research and development output. If the output from a research effort, over
and beyond its initial specific mission, can provide technology that is productively
used in many locations and/or by a number of organizations, then the original cost
of the research can be viewed as providing a substantial contribution over and
above its primary task to satisfy a specific and defined need. Secondary utilization
of research and development has attracted the attention of the President of the
United States, the Department of Defense and the individual Services as a logi-
cal method of enhancing the productive output of research and development
effort .’ 2 3
Several sectors of the Navy have taken an a~ ive role leading toward moreeffect ive use of research and development output. Three such efforts are appro-
priate to be mentioned here: (I) The Headquarters. Naval Material Command.
Washington. D.C. has been developing communications networks and technol-
ogy documentation and distribution systems specifcally directed toward the en-
hancement of the use of research and development output. (2) Certain faculty of
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California have been investigating the
processes. concepts. framework and methodology of technology transfer. (3) The
Headquarters. Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D.C. has
conducted several studies and has introduced several programs within its com-
mand that deal directly and specifically with the desire to enhance the utilization
of research and development output.3
This book is a documentation of the papers presented at the June 9, 1975
one-day briefing jointly sponsored by the Naval Material Command, the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command and the Naval Postgraduate School.
The intent of the one-day briefing was to present to interested persons a review
of the progress being made in understanding the processes, concepts. framework
and methodology of technology transfer. The approach was to present both
theoretical work and practical case histories demonstrating the use of the theory.
There are relatively few centers in the United States doing what is sometimes
called, “Research on Research” or more specifically research on methods of
enhancing the utilization of researc h output. In addition to the Naval Post-
graduate School. one of the centers that is concentrating considerable effort on
this subject is the University of Michigan Center for Researc h on Utilization of
Scientific Knowledge (CRUSK). The work of CRUSK with the U.S. Forest
Service (USFS) has resulted in interesting new methodology and meaningful case
histories. Because of this Dr. David Lingwood of CRUSK and Mr. Hal Marx of
the USFS were invited tO participate in the one-day briefing.
Rear Adm. C. P. Ekas USN, Director of Technology Transfer. Headquarters.
Naval Material Command, was the host. The briefing was held at the command
briefing auditorium at Crystal City Plaza Arlington Virginia
‘Prespdcnt~ message to Congress. March 1972
1Deputy Secretary of Defense memo to military services. June 2 1 . 1972. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~Accounting Office Repoil (GAOl. December ~9. 1972.
t __ $916 
All of the papers presented at the briefing were recorded on audio tape. These
were then transcribed and a transcription was sent to each author for editing. The
syntax of each paper as it appears here is the author’s choice. Some of the papers
are essentially a verbatim transcription of the author’s speech, while others have
been edited to have a syntax akin to a paper prepared for a technical journal.
The printing of this book on technology transfer papers is the joint effort of the
Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval Material Command, Washington, D.C.
As editors it is appropriate and with sincere appreciation that we extend thanks
to each of the authors whose papers appear in this book, to Rear Adm. C. P.
Ekas. Mr. Perry Newton. Ms. Sterling Atchinson and Ms. Linda Massaro of the
Naval Material Command, Washington. D.C., and to Capt. Vince Skrinak and
Mr. Tim Rohrer of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
Monterey, California J. A. Jolly, Ph.D.
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-: M. E. Essog lou
Assistant Commander for Research and Development,
Plans and Programs Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
_ _ _ _ _ _  -
—I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~
This morning we hope to tell you why the Naval Facilities Engineering Com-
mand (NAVFAC) embarked on the series of studies and other efforts bearing on
the subject of technology transfer. We have also included in our program today
one case history of a specific technology transfer event. However, the main thrust
of our presentations is essentially intended to tell you what we have done in terms
of organizational considerations, behavioral considerations and the kinds of things
that really constitute the technology transfer problem.
Before discussing my main topic, I feel it is necessary to give you a brief
chronology of certain events that the Assistant Commander for Research and
Development of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command has been essentially
responsible for since about 1962. Those of you familiar with the literature on
tec hnology transfer will see that there is some correlation between the distribution
of various books and papers on the subject of technology transfer and the appa-
rent timing of our management actions as reflected in the dates shown ~n FigureI—I. This figure shows that in addition to sponsoring studies at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS), we have taken a number of other actions, partially as a
result of’ the guidance indicated from the NPS studies, and partially from our own
knowledge and reading of the general literature and our intuitive perception of
what we thought we should be doing to enhance technology transfer in the NAV-
FAC family of organizations. I would like to point out that these events indicate
an awareness of technology transfer as a conscious type activity as opposed to the
more random, traditional technological diffusion. Our awareness that people, and
people to people type contact , is the way to solve most of these problems as
opposed to the more formal bureaucratic type approaches, is also reflected by
some of c1ur actions shown in Figure 1—I .
1. RDT&E AssIstance (1962)
- 2. RDT&E UtIlization (1964)
3. Mandatory Task Proposals (1965)
4. Technology Tranefer (1966)
A. Applications DiVisiOn
B, ROT&E Liaison at Field Level
C. NASA and Other Programs
5. CEL Report Utilizafton
& Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
(1967—70)
6. NP$ Technology Transfer Study (1970)
7. CEL Field Engineering Support OffIce (1971)
8. RDT&E Assistance Doubles—
$100 to 200 K (1971)
9. CEL/NAVFAC Workshop (1972. 1974)
FIgure 1-1 ChrOnOlogy of NAVFAC’S Technology Transfer
Let me explain what we mean by RDT&E assistance and RDT&E utilization.
The user is generally a man in one of our field offices. These users of our technol-
ogy have always felt that the Civil Engineering Laboratory (CEL) never quite
solved the problem of a given research task fast enough to make the results useful
for his operating needs. Therefore, to make laboratory expertise readily available,
we set up the RDT&E Assistance Program by setting some money aside for
laboratory personnel to answer , on short notice, questions raised by the field. The
RDT&E Utilization Progra m refers to efforts in our Headquarters such as the
establishment of a division responsible for the utilization of the research output of
the laboratory. This program was a Headquarters function whose mode of opera-
tion was primarily through administrative tools like instructions, memoranda. etc.
2
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Notice that while it focused on the problem, its separateness from the “people
agents” in the producer-user dialogue provided the seeds for its failure and dis-
continuance by 1966.
We went through a phase about 1965, where it was clearly recognized that if the
customers had input in formulating t he research program the odds were that the
output would be utilized more readily. We went through a typical bureaucrat ic
routine where we required all field activities to submit a minimum number of
proposals per year. Well , needless to say, that did not work , because we im-
mediately were swamped with proposals and had to screen out most of them and
show that they were not worthy of pursuit.
Awareness of technology transfer in NAVFAC. as far as I can determine,
dates back to 1966. A number of independent initiatives relating to technology
transfer took place in 1966. As history of technological innovation amply docu-
ments , technology transfer and innovations usually happen when several people
in an organization, or even far apart , exposed to various ideas in their own spheres
of the operation tend to converge on the same idea or development. As it is also
well known, innovation needs a champion during its early infancy stages. For
example, the Applications Division was established in the office of R&D at
the direction of the “boss”, a Rear Admiral who was at that time Deputy Com-
mander for Acquisition where R&D is located.
The RDT&E liaison effort at the field level, on Figure I—I , is something for
which I have to take the blame. During the R&D Utilization era we were con-
cerned with the vertical flow of information that came in from our Laboratory , and
getting it into the Command’s business. The mainstream of NAVFAC’s business
is writing spec ifications for procurement of various items that are constructed or
manufactured. R&D utilization activity was essentially confined in the Headquar-
ters. More than three-fourths of the engineers in the NAVFAC organization are
located in the Field Divisions, i.e., Philadelphia. Norfolk, Charleston. San
Bruno. and Pearl Harbor. it was apparent that the organization was literally cut
out of the process of introducing new technology. A new technology or idea had
to go from the laboratory to the Washington level, and from the Washington level
it had to be promulgated out to the field. We all know that it is the man in the field
who feels the pain of unsolved technical problems and has the need to implement
an innovative and promising solution. It is not so for the bureaucrat in Washington
who for many good reasons acts as a stabilizing agent in promulgating and main-
taining policies. Through the establishment of the RDT&E Liaison Officer , at
each one of our Field Divisions, we felt that we would by-pass some of the
inevitable though unconscious barriers that the Washington Headquarters interpose.
In brief , we felt tha4~ince we operate mainly as a decentralized organization, whynot let the R&D program planning and utilization go somewhat decentralized.
Other advantages that the R&D Liaison Program had over the old Utilization
Division were : (a) fostering a mechanism of inter-field division transfer of innova-
tive solutions generated in the field, and (b) elimir.ating Headquarters jealousy as
to who should be in charge of the utilization business, R&D or Engineering.
In 1967 one of our Assistant Commanders became quite sensitive to the prob-
1cm of unu~,ed tec hnology and directed our Laboratory to undertake a consciouseffort to determine to what extent technical reports were being utilized. The
Laboratory turned to the Naval Postgraduate School in the 1967—1969 period.
Most of the Postgraduate School effort did not start however until 1970. Again to
use a phrase that has appeared in the literature “every invention needs a cham-
pion”. In the Navy you need aggressive and innovative people to champion new
ideas and approaches. Around 1970 we were fortunate enough to have such a
person in the Assistant Commander for Research and Development. He felt that
we should initiate a “research on research” effort at the Naval Postgraduate
3
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School directed towards NAVFAC’ s needs. In 1971. the new Commanding
Officer of the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory noticed that while we had made
provisions to deal with this transfer problem in Headquarters and at the Field
act ivities, in his own laboratory he could not find a focal point. As a result , he
established the Field Engineering Support Office (FESO) whose sole purpose was
to see that the customers in the field were satisfied and got the information they
requested in a timely manner. This focal point in CEL now serves as a “linker” or
a “gatekeeper”. (Gene Early, who has headed that office, will elaborate on this in
another paper.) Since answering questions does take time, and the mode of in-
dustrial funding of Navy laboratories does not allow a man to take time from his
assigned tasks unless he has something to charge that time against, it became
ev ident that specific resources available at the Laboratory to make quick advice
possible had to be increased. The earmarked RD f&E Assistance fund was then
doubled.
In 1972. and agaiu in 1974. we pulled together the entire NAVFAC community
of people working on technology transfer, i.e., Civil Engineering Laboratory
personnel, the RDT&E Liaison Officers from our Field Divisions, Headquarters
personnel, and the Naval Postgraduate researchers. We held workshops exchang-
ing views, experiences and frustrations.
This is a thumbnail sketch of why and how we got where we are today.
The Postgraduate School Studies
Fi gure 1—2 shows the studies that have been carried out by the Naval Post-
graduate School (N PS). In my talk this morning, I will concentrate on the work
done on the two particular studies which we feel are really the mainstream of the
NPS work. These are: ENHANCEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DE-
VELOPMENT OUTPUT UTILIZATION EFFICIENCIES: LINKER
CONCEPT METHODOLOGY IN THE TECHNOLOGY T R A N S F E R
PROCESS. by 3. W. Creighton, J. A. Jolly, S. A. Denning, 30 June 1972 and
TECHNOLOG Y TRANSFER AND UTILI/ATION METHODOLOGY;
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE LINKER CONCEPT, byi. A. Jolly,J. W.
Creighton. 30 June 1974. We went to NPS for this work because it became
apparent that our prior approaches to technology transfer problems lacked the
skill of the kind of people who are trained in behavioral science. By seeking the
assistance of the School of Operations Researc h and Administrative Science at
the Naval Postgraduate School. we would get the people whose background and
training would allow them to attac k our problem from a point of view slightly
different from that of the typical “physical science” oriented engineer. Further
we reasoned that since these people were essentially in an in-house Navy
graduate school, with familiarity of the Navy system, we could get more for our
money. They. more than any other faculty. mi ght have a better feeling for the kind
of organization and the kind of person we have in the Navy Departmcnt. Yet
another reason for going to the Naval Postgraduate School was the fact that the
Navy sends several hundred Naval officers (not only Civil Engineer Corps)
through this school every year, and the mere exposure of these graduate student
officers to the problems and concepts of technology transfer would have a rapidly
multiplying beneficial effect when they would return to the Fleet. Washington or
other field activities throughout the Navy. As we look at our results , I am person-
ally inclined to feel that the exposure of several hundred oflicers a year to
technology transfer topics, issues , readings, and projects has sensitized these
people to this particular issue. If nothing else comes from th~s research, thistraining value alone will bring payoff to the Navy in the years to come in ways that
we may never be able to trace. Last , hut not least, doing business with NPS is
4
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bound to have benefits resulting from the accumulation of studies. The result is
the development of an in-house Navy cadre of expe rtise in this area.
1. UTILIZATION OF CEL TECHNICAL RE- 6. FESO PROJEC T EFFECTIVENESS PRO-
PORTS , Naval Postgraduate School, 1969. FILE: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 1973
2. DISTRIBUTION OF CEL TECHNICAL RE- QUESTIONNAIRE RESUL TS, September
PORTS, Naval Postgraduate School, 1970 1974
3. ENHANCEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DE- 7. INVESTIGATION OF INSTITUTIONAL AND
VELOPMENT OUTPUT UTILIZATION EF- BEHAVIORAL BARRIERS TO TECHNOL-
FI CIENCIES: LINKER CONCEPT OGY FLOW AND UTILIZATION. December
METHODOLOGY IN THE TECHNOLOGY 1974
TRAN SFER PROCESS. Naval Post- 8. AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVE-
graduate School, NPS-55CF72061A, June NESS OFA RESEARCH ORGANIZA TION’S
1972 (AD 756-694) MECHANISM FOR TRANSFERRING
4. FESO PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS PRO- TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO APPLIED
FILE. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF 1972 END USE. Naval Postgraduate School ,
QUESTIONNAIRE RESUL TS, October 1973 55J074121, December 1974 (AD A003-501)
5. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND UTILIZA- 9. THE POWER LINE DISTURBANCE
TION METHODOLOGY: FURTHER MONITOR: A CASE STUD Y OF THE
ANALYSIS OF THE LINKER CONCEPT. NAVY’S CONTINUING EFFORTS IN THE
Naval Postgraduate School, NPS- FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
55.1074061, June 1974 (AD A003-867) Naval Postgraduate School , NPS
55J075031
Figure 1—2 NAVFAC Technology Transfer Studies by the Naval Postgraduate School
Having provided the backgrounl histo~y of NAVFAC’ s involvement, now
let ’s look at the results of our studies. Technology transfer takes place when there
is a source, a transfer mechanism of some sort , and utilization of the knowledge
(Figure 1—3) . The process may be quite complex but in the simplest sense this is
what we are talking about. I would like to point out that this model, Figure 1—3. is
essentially true whether we are talking about the vertical flow of technálogy, i.e.,
from a laboratory to a given application, in a given discipline, or the horizontal
transfer of technology. as from one industry or activity to another. In all cases the
— source must emit a signal which the user must then receive and respond to ii. It
can then be said that technology transfer has occurred.
EEoc
FIgure 1—3 A Simple Technology Transfer Model
The ‘linker” model was developed by Professors Jolly and Creighton and
I.TJG S. A. Denning, who was then a student. The elements in the linker model
are shown in Figure 1—4 . The model essentiall y says that all of these factors affect
the transfer mechanism. Now, if we knew how and how much these factors
affected the transfer mechanism in a given organizational situation, we could
modify t hem by direct management action based on fact rather than intuition or
guess. Needless to say, quantifying this particular model has not been done. It is a
tough job to do. and whether it will ever be done is questionable. In any case, this5
model serves as a very useful conceptual framework around which we can or-
ganize our thinking and approaches to the problem. I would like to briefly describe
the elements of this model.
FORMAL FACTORS
Method of Information DOCUDocumentation
The Distribution System DIST
Formal Organization of the ORGAUser
Selection Process for Projects PROJ(Users Contribution)
Soucce tJtiiizat,on
INFORMAL FACTORS of i nowIe~ge
Knowledge (Used
(Supgiief ) Capacity of the Receiver CAPA
Informal Linkers in the LINKReceiving Organization
Credibility as Viewed by CREDthe Receiver
Perceived Reward to the REWAReceiver
Willingness to be helped WILL
FIGURE 1-4 The Information Linker Model
Documentation is a factor in the transfer of technology. Very simply we are
talking about the format , the organization, the language. Does the laboratory
write a report that can only be understood by people in another similar laboratory,
or does it write a report that can be understood by a practicing engineer?
Distribution deals with the physical channels used to distribute the
information—the entry, the exit , the plan, redundancy. This is perhaps the easiest
to measure or appraise.
Organization plays a very important part in determining how the technology is
going to get transferred, if at all. The power structure , the nature of the business ,
the management style. resources , att itudes , bureaucratic tendencies , and state of
equilibrium. These kinds of things need to be measured or appraised. if we are to
quantify this factor called organization, obviously the prospects for success are
difficult.
6
Project selection. This factor concerns who initiates the proiect , who approves .
who authoriies. w ho monitors, and who is consulted about the project. Project
selection is very critical in the ultimate utilization of research. One tends to utili,e
that which he helps develop.
Professor Jolly has seen fit to divide these factors into formal and informal as
shown in Figure i—S. Formal factors are things we can lay our hands on. the kinds
of things we can operate on fairly directl y. They are really sys tem oriented. The
informal factors are highly behavioral and sociological and therefore quite tough
to handle. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Federal Government has
concerned itself mainly with formal documentation, storage . and distribution as-
sistance , like the Defense ’Documentalion (enter and has ignored the informal
factors. This observation. I believe, was made by Samuel Doctors in his 1969
book “The Role of Federal Agencies in Technology Transfer”. It would seem
that if reports and papers were available on the desks of the engineers and scien-
tists , technology would be transferred. This is not the case. We must recognize
FORMAL FACTORS
Procedures for dissemination of storage,







Interpersonal communications and con-
tacts, personal beliefs and feelings about a
knowledge source, perceptions about one s
organization, supervisors and peers.
FIGURE 1—5 Knowled ge flow enhancemen t factors divided according to formal vs
informa l.
that the problem has two dimensions. One that is fairly manageable is the question
of storage and distribution of technical information through various information
systems. It is a relatively straight forward problem, however complex. The sec-
ond dimension is the set of items called “informal factors”, which deals with
perceptions. it gets quite a bit more complicated when trying to manage such a set
of factors because its science base is primarily behavioral rather than physical.
Let ’ s now look at these “informal” factors.
Capacity refers to characteristics of individuals in the user organization that are
described by terms like venturesomeness , wealth, power, education. experience.
age. self-confidence, etc. Ohvk~’ sly these characteristics are vague and difficult totranslate into quantifiable variables for analysis or design purposes . Yet they are
very important in the transfer process.
The linAer is essentially the individual or group of individuals who does exactly
what the term implies. It is probably the single most important factor. They link
t he source and the application. Linker is a term that Professors Creighton and
Jolly use in their research. The literature shows other somewhat similar terms in
use by various other research teams.
7
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Cre dibility of the source is ohviousl~ an essential factor. (‘erta inly if the
“would-he” user does not heIic~e the mcssage he is gett ing. he will reject it. Theinformation t hat is being transferred must therefore emanate fro m a source that is
at least credible according to the perception of’ t he reci pient or the potential user.
The n ’uard ~ and penalties) for the consequences of app~ — ing technology that is“new ” to t he receiving organization imposed by management arc cruc ial.
Namely. il a man is to get penalized more than rewarded, he will most certainly he
disinclined to import a new piece of technology idea, or approach that which is
‘untried” within his particular organization.
simpk is the fact that a man who is going to make use of a piece of’
tec hnical information must he willing to recei’e the message and must he willing
to implement it. It is that simple. and that subjecti~c. Obviously a number of’t hings could affect a man ’s willingness.
Of all the elements in the linker model, the linl,er element was chosen for study
because it seemed to focus on people most directly. From other similar research
reported in the literature, it was established that the human factor is probably the
most important element in technology transfer.
The linker is associated with the source, or with the user, or he could he
somew here in between, or linkers could he at both ends (see Figure 1—6) . Profe s-
sors Creighton and Jolly (and the literature ) are inclined to feel that the linker is
more appropriatel~ a member of the user team. I tend to place the linker in themiddle because he is not an individual, he is the synergistic effect of all the people




information or Linker information or
knowledge knowledge
Source of User of
information or Linker information or
knowledge ,know ledge
Source of User of
information or Linker informntion or
knowledge 
. knowledge
F I GURE l~~ Linker Posit ions in the Flow of Knowledge K
t heir respective contacts must link. 1.inkage occurs when mutual excitation be-
tween two individuals occurs because their values match at least for the particular
technology transfer event. Indeed ii’ t he linker is at the user end and he enjoys the
confidence of the would-be using team. he can operate internally in the organiza-
tion to get the idea iriplemented or used.
At the beginning when I spoke of’ the chronology of NAVFAC ’ s tec hnology
transfe r efforts , I mentioned the establishment of’ the Field Engineering Support
Office (FESO). in the Civil Fngineering Laboratory. This was a conscious hit-
reaucra t ic act to establish a visible, and at least a formal, linker at the Laboratory
or the source. The estab lishment of Liaison Officers at the Engineering Field
Di~ isions was similarly a conscious act to formally designate linkers at the FieldDivisions , t he user organizations. Whether these people at-c in fact effect ive
linkers as the literature described linkers is a diflerent matter: we don ’t know.
( once i~ahly we could study them. The point is that these formally des ignatedlinker jobs were not necessarily filled with “linker type ” people. The qualities of
the linker are listed on Figure 1—7. At the time these jo bs were tilled there were
very few, essent ially intuitive. criteria in judging the potential linker attributes of
the individuals selected for the Liaison and FESO positions. You all know the
typical recruitment process we go through in the government . Furthermore . in
filling these jobs. selection was limited to available peop le. In some cases there
was no se lection in terms of individuals, hut rather only in terms of organizational
convenience. In any case it is difficult to select people who will link. It’ you
succee d, it is an accident as much as it is design.
GREAT MAN (CLOCK AND MENZEL
1958)
INNOVATIVE, WILLING TO ACCEPT SC I ENTI FIC TROUBADOR (M ENZ EL
RI SK , ACTIVE IN MULTI-DISCIPLINES, 1964, HODGES AND NELSON 1965)
MORE INFORMATION CONTACTS, INTERNAL CONSULTANT (ALLEN et al
COSMoPOLrr~ OR~ NTED TOWARDS 
TECHNOLOGICAL GATE KEEPER
OUTSIDE INFORMATION SOURCES. (ALLEN 1966)
OPINION LEADER (LAZARSFELD 1948,
KATZ 1957)
FIGURE 1—7 Attributes of Linkers FIGURE I—S Writings on Aspects of
the Linker Concept
The linker concept is not particularly original in that many authors have, in a
sense , touched upon the notion of the linker from time to time in their works (see
F igure I—s) . What is new in the work done at the Naval Postgraduate School is
t hat all these terms and definitions are recognized as subsets within a universal
linker set.
In order to get on with the job of approaching quantification of the linker model.
it was decided to survey first the Navy ’s officer sector in charge of NAVFAC and
its Field act i~ ities . This was done using a questionnaire (Appendix A)designed tomeasure whether a person in a given situation would be inclined to t’unci ion as a
linker or the opposite. a stabilizer. Would he he innovative ’? Would he he prone to
accept the risks that would go with the acceptance and application of a new idea?
Wou ld he he a person with a high number of ’ sources of ’ information at his dis-
posal’! Would he he acquainted in many areas ’? We could not go around and
inter~iew 1.7(X) people, so we had to design a fairly clever questionnaire . The
-: answer to any one question does not indicaw that a man is a linker or a stabilizer.
9
It is the answers to a number of questions and combinations of questions that
would cause us to categorize one man a linker , and another man a stabilizer.
Initially we tried to determine who the linkers and stabilizers were among t he
Civ il Engineer Corps Officers.* After seeing the distributions of the resulfs , we
wondered what the distribution of linkers versus stabilizers would be for civilians
GS—8 and above. The results are shown in Figures 1—9 , 1— b A and I— lOB. On the
basis of the questionnaires and distributions between officers and civilians on the
linker-stabilizer scale, we cannot say that civilians are more prone to he linkers
than officers or the other way around.
1972 1726 NAVAL OFFICERS
(CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS ONLY)
(65% RESPONSE)
1973 2954/4464 GS..8 to GS-16 NAVFAC
CIVILIANS (54% RESPONSE)
NOT POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN THE TWO POPULA-
TIONS (CLASSEN 1973)
THE LINKER-STABILIZER BE-
HAVIOR CHARACTERISTIC HAS A
GENERAL BASE IN TERMS OF
TECHNICALLY TRAINED PER-
SONNEL, AND IS NOT UNIQUE TO
A SELECT POPULATION
FIGURE 1—9 The Officers and Civilians Part icipating hi th e Linker -
Stabi lizer Survey
An examination of the data frot~ these questionnaires reveals three questionsthe answers to which suggest that in some ways Naval Officers and civilians
behave somewhat differently (Figure I—Il ) .  Naval officers seem to attend fewer
professional meetings and one can perhaps understand that because their mobility
prevents their becoming established, They depend heavily on literature . For in-
stance, when you arc in charge of construction contracts one day, the next day
you move into a design division, and two years later you move into a staff posi-
tion, you are changing quite rapidly. Following literature rather than the profes-
sional community contacts becomes more logical and easier. On the other hand
the civilian is more inclined to use his personal experience. The civilian tends to
stay for a number of years , provides continuity in the organization and can draw
from the problems he had several years ago in developing answers o new situa-
tions. Figure i— I I shows that civilians tend to center interests with their fellow
workers whereas officers more often center interests with people doing similar
work,
I can only urge the interested reader to obtain a copy of the thesis and see the
extent to which results of that work could he applied to your organization. It is
emphatically stated that we did not do this survey or cross section in order that
officers and civilians would be labeled as linkers or stabilizers and then keep them
in or out of certain jobs . Although we know who the linkers and the stabilizers
are , we do not know how to integrate thai inform:ttion with all the other do’s and
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Figure I--lOB A distribution of the scores of the Naval Officer Civil Engineers
in response to the questionnaire which was intended to measure the magn itude
of their Stabilizer -Linker traits .
don’ts ofjob selection. I want to make it very clear that we have no designs at this
time to start shifting people around because they are linkers or stabilizers, The
nature of the data is experimental and complex problems arise in satisfy ing per-
sonnel and organizational goals, There is no basis to even suggest personnel
reassignment at this time—perhaps in the future when our total study is completed
and accepted by management as a basis for selection.
I have rearranged the basic linker model (Figure 1—12) , to facilitate my telling
you what we have done in NAVFAC to promote technology transfer:
I .  Selection ikfpsv ~je ets—we have stepped up our efforts to make use of ourField Liaison RDT&E people in letting us know in Headquarters what the
OFFICERS BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY FROM CIVILIANS BY:
ATTENDING FEWER PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS
DEPEND MORE HEAVILY ON LITERATURE
CENTERING INTERESTS WITH PEOPLE DOING SIMILAR WORK
CIVILIANS BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY FROM OFFICERS BY:
ATTENDING MORE PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS
USING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MORE OFTEN
CENTERING INTERESTS WITH FELLOW WORKERS
FIGURE 1-lI
Characteristics that are different between Naval Officer Civil En.
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FIGURE l—12 ActIvItie s Applied to the Basic Linke r Model
field perceived R&D needs are, and what researc h projects they want
funded.
2. In/ ornuiliol, docunzenuuio,,—in addition to technical reports the laboratory
now puts out several additional types of publications that are readable and
more responsive to the non-researc h practicing engineer and maintenance
personnel. These are one or two page briefs of significant technical ac-
complishments (Tech Data Sheets) and periodic status reporting of work
still in progress. (RAP Briefs). Also pictorial-graphic brochures are more
widely used. Communication awareness seems to be spreading among re-
searchers and management at last !
3. lul()r,nauo,, ~Iisirjbutio,,—Distribution lists tend to go out of date quiterapidly and must be constantly maintained. An organization can he satu-
rated with a lot of literature that is not needed for its particular mission.
Economizing by avoiding the fine tuning of distribution lists for specifc
technological output tends to prevent effective distribution. Attempting to
keep distribution lists up to date is a continuing job. Distribution is also
directed to individuals and not merely to “desks”.
4. Tc’c/,n ic-al ~‘rec/j hi1j tv—Er ’ank l y ,  we do not have a se~ good way of knowingwhether recent technology transfer act ivities have caused the technical cred-
ibility of our laboratory. as perceived by t he man in the held. to go up or
down. I could speculate and say, “yes, I think it has gone up.” When I do
this I am not being true to empiricism and the purpose of having NPS do
research on our research. We want to generate a certain amount of hard data
in order that management can gel a better anderstanding of our particular
technology transfer processes as a basis for policy and action. Without
credible facts , neither Headquarters nor laboratory management can take
action towards greater user credibility of the laboratory. Perhaps we need a
survey of opinions from time to time to track credibility of the laboratory.
I mentioned the lissI.ers at some length. We have done studies with the assist-
ance of the Naval Postgraduate School to Ity to improve our understanding ot’ our
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form al organization and to determine whether it impedes or enhances the flow of
technology. In regards to the fr( ’ /, ,ucal c ’apac ’il .v of’ our organization to make
effective use of our laboratory generated technology, I do not think we have data
as of now to tell you that we do or do not have it. Some of the future studies by
NPS will hopefully he directed towards a measure of technical capacity as defined
earlier. Again, intuitively, I believe over the years the output of CEL has become
tuned to the technical capacity of NAVFAC , but again this can be contested.
I. Reward/Penal t y —The reward and penalty associated with introducing new
technology, however important , has not been studied, measured or assessed
in our organization. Again, intuit ively, it appears to me that there is more
concern over the consequences and probabilities of failure (however low)
than over the consequences of success (however high).
2. W illingness to rece ive—We have made it possible for anyone who needs
technology information to be physically able to receive it. Means exist, i.e..
money and telephones, for a man in need anywhere in our organization to
consult the engineer or scientist at the laboratory. We. at least in the R&D
shop. cannot however , induce his desire to do so. The R&D organization at
the Naval Facilities Command headquarters can only make technology
available. It cannot induce the desire of a field engineer to make use of’ the
technology, The previously mentioned factor “Reward/Penalty ” has much
to do with the will ingness to receive.
In closing, let me just say that our efforts are continuing and we hope that in the
years to come we can develop some significant body of hard data that car serve as
a concrete basis for management selection to improve the technology transfer
environment throughout. Also we hope that our research results can be of value to
other government and industrial organizations.
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I see by the roster that most of you are from the R&D community. I am new to
the R&D field only having been involved for about a yea. now . I would like to
submit to you that the people outside of the R&D communt y are doing a lot of
complaining. I suggest if you stop and think about it a minute, it can be traced
directly to technology transfer , because unitl you get that product into the hands
of the field engineers and they can use it, they are incensed because you are
working on what you want to work on. not what the field sees as vital to their
present needs—you are not working on their problems. So from an operator ’s
standpoint this is what we have to overcome, and it is going to be a long time in
overcoming. It will take real effort .
So with that I would like to summarize what ~.ou have heard this morning. Firstof all, I think the thread that ties this all together was Milon Lssoglou ’s pitch on
the Linker Study. What is the methodology—t he mechanism—where by we can
transfer our technology? I think this is very important and I will refer back to it
again and again as it is the cornerstone, the building bloc k, on which we have to
evaluate technology transfer. Also as you have heard in our past experience here,
the RDT&E Liaison Engineers were set up before we had the linker study, but
once we had the linker study we found out that very fortunately we had fallen into
a number of good things. We set up f he Liaison Engineer so we would have a
“gatekeeper”—one who would take in the technology to our Field Divisions and
disseminate it to our engineers. We also had another purpose which we found very
valuable, and that as he was collecting the problems and feeding them back to the
laboratory. we got the field engineers to have a feeling of relevance to R&D when
we did work on their particular projects. We have that relationship which was
referred to in the linker study. Early involvement in project selection is important.
We then have these relationships with the linker study and its analysis of technol-
ogy transfer mechanisms,
In RDT&E Assistance , we have a response to the field, and I refer back to the
linker study, Until we can get credibility in the field and until they know we are
working on their problems , we are going to have a barrier to our technology
transfer. RDT&E Assistance is one small part of that, where we can respond to
the field s needs and try to get our credibility established again in their eyes with a
resultant w~Itingness on their part to more readily accept R&D technology comingout of our Laboratory.
The Techdata Sheets and RAP Briefs were alluded to very briefly this
morning—but what we have done here is to try to get a very high impact and an
immediate feedback to the field. One that hits you between the eyes. You get it on
a single sheet, not a report about 25 pages long with double and triple integrations
which when the normal man in the field looks at it says that ’s no good to me and
throws it away. The bottom line on these reports may be of extreme value, be it
corrosion studies , be it maintenance reduction, or whatever it is, We have Tech-
data Sheets and RAP Briefs that are intended to have a high impact. Are you
interested?lf so. this has all the information you are looking for and who to call for
more information. We are getting the distribution and the documentation to the
field in the best way we know at this time in order to get the ..laximum amount of
technology transfer,
These are the effort s then that we have had in the past (See Figure 2—I ) . What
do we have right now (see Figure 2—2)? We had a complete analysis of our
program—where is it paying. the cost benefits in what categories, where are the
most benefits coming from with regard to callers , with regard to stations, with
regard to geographical areas? So we have an analysis in this area to look at and
possibly assis’ us in emphasizing our technology transfer efforts to improve its
impact.
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FIGURE 2—1 LIsted here are the var- FIGURE 2—2 The current work Is dl-
bus  st*. ps that have been taken to Im- rected toward determining the ROt of
prove the NAVFAC Technology Traits- RDT&E Assistance and to study the
fet’ effectiveness. Facilitators to Technology Transfer.
I put facilitators in Figure 2—2 as opposed to barriers. You can put it any way
you like . This afternoon Dr. Jolly will be talking about a comparison of Navy
organizations with civilian organizations. Are there similarities? Are they differ-
ent and if different why? What we are looking at then is how can we compare
ourselves with civilian institutions and on-going efforts.
I think the most important aspect then is what do we see coming out in the
future (See Figure 2—3). Again, as a spin-off from the technology transfer efforts
of Professor Creighton and Professor Jolly, we have asked , and they have come
up with, a course—a short course. We are not talking about anything new , really,
in this course. You all have applied the principles that were ‘Jiscussed this morn-
ing on the linker study, but it is a matter now of getting technology transfer for our
technology. The only way we can get it to the field is to get out there and let the
people know what we are doing, what are the barriers, what are the facilitators of
technology transfer, and try to open up some of the minds that are there in our
Engineering Field Divisions and at Headquarters.
NAVFAC TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
FUTURE
SHORT COURSE ON TECH TRANSFER
ROI
DEFINITION OF CLASSES OF SUCCESS
STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
FIGURE 2-3 LIsted here are several of the projects that are planned for the future.
As before the objecti ve Is to Improve the NAVFAC Technology Transfer effective-
ness,
We are very optimistic and hope that this will pay some dividends back , but
again we hope to have the first course shortly and get this information out to all of
our engineers and scientists.
Return on investment—this is under the gun more and more . What is your
return on R&D? We would like very much to get a handle on just what we are
• talking about here. Definitions are critical in this area. Two come to mind im-
mediately in evaluating return on investment—the definition of classes of success
and standards of accomplishment. We can write a report and it might be a very
good report and it might sit on that shelf for 10 years before it is needed. Well , was
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it successful? Let us define what we mean by success. I think there are many
different categories here , so I think those have to be defined and classified.
What should we be shooting for at the Civil Engineering Laboratory in the way
of technology transfer and our results? Not only that , but we have to define, as
you saw in the linker study, two things. There is no way we can hold the Civil
Engineering Laboratory responsible for what ultimately ends up as being trans-
ferred to the field. Why? Because ‘here is another guy locked in the middle there.
Now the laboratory can be responsible for what is source oriented—they gener-
ated it and that generates , if you will allow me to quote an author, “opportunities
to exploit ”, hut then the users of that must take those opportunities and actually
put them to use. And I think here we have to define our terms so that we can look
at the Laboratory and determine how they are doing and how others are doing in
exploiting opportunities. One of you may be doing well, or both may be doing well
but we have to have a refined classification in order to evaluate our standards of
accomplishment.
Those are the areas then that I look for in our continued involvement with
technology transfer.
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Introduction
(‘ongress has authorized the I)epartment ol’ t)efense (DOD) to spcnd a record
$9.3 billion this year on militar~ researc h. development , test and evaluation( RI)T&F . (Ref. I) . Does this mean that taxpayers are investing on/v in researc h
for an arms race that may ultimatel~ end tn nuclear holocaust ’?Not so! In addition to prov iding for a strong future national defense, a stibstan-
tia l port ion of military researc h and development expenditures are quietly financ-
ing new tcchnology that will conttihute to the progress of civilian soc iety . perhaps
even to its sti rs ival. Military ads ances in areas such as medical research , en-
ironmenta l protection, and air traffic control , j ust to ment ion a few , are also
products of defense RDT&E spending and deserve equa’ billing as they are
successfull~ transl’erred from military to c ivilian application in order to sol’. esOCiet ‘s motunting problems.
Criticism Levied at DOD R&D
In recent years . ct i t ics have posed questions such as: “Why can ’t DOE) de-
ve lop a technology utilization program such as NASA did during the peak years
of the space program ? Look at t he spin-oft’benefits that accrued to all Americans ,
even the entire world, from that program!”
Criticism of this nature is certainly legitimate and was recognized by t he Presi-
dent when he stated ,
“As we face the new challenges of the 1970’ s we can draw upon a great
reservoir of scientific and technological information and skill—the results of
t he enormotis investments which both the Federal Government and private
enterpr ise made in research and development in recent years . .  we must
appreciate that the progress we seek requires a new partnership in science
and technology—one which brings together the Federal (jot ernment. pri-
sa te enterpr ise, state and local gosernments . and our un iver sit ies and re-
seatc h centers in a coordinated , cooperat ive effort to serve the national
interest ( Ref. 2) .
In response to the President ’s policy statement. seve ral DOD R&D
laboratories joined together in July 1971 to form the DOD Technology Transt ’er
(‘onsort ium, the purpose of which ts “t he transfe r of existing knowledge,
facilities , or capabilities acquired while working on militar~ researc h and de-ve lopment projects . to the solution of civil problems,” (Ref. 3) . Spurred b~ theknowledge that military research funds expended by DOD can also benefi t other
segments 01 our society, the consortium has grown from eleven to thirty-one
Army. Navy, and Air Force laboratories, (Ref. 4) . In November, 1974 . member-
ship was extended to all government laboratories and the Federal Technology
Transfe r ( onsortium was formed,
The Navy’s Technology Trar~sfer Program
rhe Nav~ , ss~ ose share of the fiscal sear l97~ 1)01) RDT&F budget totaledS3.~ billion, has been a strong ads ocate of technology transl’er for mans years.There are thirty-seven Na’.~ act is i t tes invo lsed in research and developmentth roughout the L nited States , each ss,th a specific researc h and development
mission. ( Ref. ~ ). Because the Nat y- ~ lar ine (‘orps team operates in ‘ill of theearth’ s environments—at sea, underwater. and on land—Navy laboratories have
been responsible for the development of new and advanced technology in many
different areas of engineering and sCience. The Navy has traditionally been a
close partner with university and commercial ocean-oriented research , and has
- - - - - - -
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always felt an obligation to share it’s achievements with these other organizations.
Consequently , t he Navy was the first military service to issue an implementing
instruction calling for an active technology transfe r program within the Navy, and
requiring the designation of a person as a contact for technology transfe r in the
var ious laboratories and components of the Navy tinder the Naval Material
Command. The instruction also calls for an anntial report of progress. (Ref. 6).
Although techno’ogy der ived from Navy R&D ha’. been applied successfu lly to
a w ide variety of’ c ivilian problems since the inception of the technology transfe r
program, the efforts of one Navy laboratory . in particular , have been an outstand-
ing success . This paper will describe their technology transfe r program and trace
the development of one product which is now available commercially and is being
used by more than 100 organizations and businesses , both in the public and
private sectors , throughout the United States and abroad,
Navy’s Civil Engineering Laboratory
The Navy ’s Civil Engineering Laboratory (CEL) located adjacent to the Pacific
Ocean in Port Hueneme. California provides a stimulating background for
creativity and technological advances. Port Hueneme means “pleasant place”
and it is not surprising that the location. just 60 miles west of Los Angeles with its
huge industrial complex, attracts the most qualified scientific and technical
ac hievers, The work of the laboratory covers a broad field of technology, going
well beyond the scope of civil engineering. The laboratory, operating on an annual
budget of $12 million, is the principal RDT&E center for shore and sea-floor
act ivities, and for the support of Navy and Marine Corps construction forces. The
laboratory ’s wor kload includes programs in electronics , san itary engineering and
mathematics. as well as physics . chemistry and allied sciences .
The staff at CEI. numbers approximately 310 . more than half of whom are
professional engineers and scientist s . Master and Doctorate degrees &nitnumher
Bachelor degrees by more than three to one. The laboratory is headed by a
military Officer-in-Charge with a solid engineering background m d  a Technical
Director who is a senior Civil Service scientist. The majorit~ sf the researc hpersonnel are Navy Civil Service employees . A job rotation program that allo ws
the individual to select his own special area of’ interest, an engineering-in-training
program , and rapid advancement are features of the (‘El, working environment.
The comment of one scientist at CEL is indicative of’ t he feelings of most of the
laboratory ’s employees: “In this age of giant strides in space , t he undersea world.
in near ly every branch of industry, the challenge is the thing that keeps us alive
and awake, Beating the challenge is the thing that gives us real job satisfaction.
Without it . life would he pretty dull,”
Technology Transfer at CEL
(‘EL has actively promoted technology transfe r for many years and is responsi-
ble for a host of Navy R&D sp in-off items that are benefiting society in the fields
of env ironmental protect ion and energy conservation. New developments have
found their way into the private sector and are stimulating corporate growth in a
period when an economic stimulus is most welcome. (‘EL possesses a wide
variety of technical expertise. To further indicate the diversity of ongoing work.
the laboratory is involved in the establishment of polar bases on snow and sea ice,
deep ocean systems . floating naval bases , waterfront structures.-power trans ient
detection and correction, even a skull/brain injury computer program. i’he suc-
cess of (‘EL’s technology transfer is attributed to the organization ’s progressive




Recogniiing the importance of technology transfer, in 1972 the laboratory c’s-4 tahlished a technology transfer program. The theme of the program centered
around the following command statement:
Implementation of the results of successful work units is perhaps the best
measure of the Command’ s success in fulfilling mission requirements~. Wemust t herefore strive at all times (‘or the increased utilization of our researc h
resu lts by the Department of Defense, the Navy, the Navy Facilities En-
gineering Command , and the entire scientific and technical community. We
must a lso manage the utilization of technology on an objective and system-
at ic basis.
(‘El ’s tec hnology utilization efforts were directed at all appropriate parts of the
Nav~ and addressed its total mission and commitments. The thrust of the programwas to c lose the gap between CEI. developed technology and acceptance and
application by a wide spectrum of Navy users. It was apparent to (‘EL that it’ their
create d technology was going to sell itself beyond the primary recipient. then a
marketing plan was also an essential ingredient. Foremost, the program must be
user oriented and involve people in both ends of the spectrum. “CEL. is going to
pus h . . . ste must involve the user so he can help pull when we push.” The
command’ s formulated technology transfCr program contained the following ele-
ments:
I. Identify underutilized CEL developed technology.
2. Identify new users and benefits to he gained by them.
3. Select candidates for marketing.
4. Assign internal CEL responsibility by product.
~. Develop background information.6. Approve/modify marketing strategy.
7. Perform an economic analysis.
H. E)evelop a marketing plan.
9. Market product (advertise).
10. Evaluate progress .
II. Publicize success or recyc’e if not successful.
Recognizing the fact that increased utilization of technology was synonymous
with increased communication between CF,L and potential users , var ious forms
of communication were evaluated and measured for effectiveness in achieving the
program’s objectives. After finalizing all aspects of the newly des’eloped technol-
ogy trans fer program. CEI ’s Ass istant Officer-in-Charge concluded, “Our utili-
zat ion efforts are experimental. We really don’t know how to promote utilization
nor does anyone else. We have some ideas that we ’ll try and we ’ll learn in the
process . We ’re talking about promoting change—aggressively promoting change
to a better way of doing things. ”
With the foundation of the program laid. (‘EL’s next step was to choose candi-
dates from ness ly developed products that were considered to he under-utilized
hut with a high potential for beneficial application within the Navy. The selection
incltided a cathodic protection kit for ship moorings, a weathered paint identifica-
t ion kit, cathodic protection system for water tanks , diver tool kits , a single line
heat-traced p~pe system. quick camp modules , funicular shell construction , and athree-p hase electric power line monitor. The development , marketing and impact
of the power line monitor on the public and private sectors as a resu’t of CF(.’s
aggressis- c technoiogy transfe r program serves as an example of the total benefits
to he gained from Navy re~carc h and development.
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CEL’s Investigation of High Quality Electric Power
During the latter months of I%3. well before any public concern was expressed
user a possible fuel shortage and its resultant effects on electrical power output.
(‘El. initiated a researc h project to determine the requirements for high quality
electric power for sensitive electronic equipment in use at Naval shore stations .
The Navy is a heavy user of electrical power in a variety of shore stations
containing tec hnical loads related to command and control, communications.
computer and navigat ion functions in support of the Navy mission. Operat ional
reliability of sensitive equipment constituting technical loads is directly affected
by the quality and reliability of power. This power is presently supplied with a
wide range of quality and reliability. At the time of the CEL study. few if any
satisfactory procedures or techniques existed which would provide for cost etTec-
tive compatibility between the quality of ‘supplied power and the power require-
ments of critical, sensitive equipment.
Development of Power Line Monitor
During CEL’ s investigation into the quality and reliability of electrical power at
Naval shore stations, it became readily apparent that some means of monitoring
and categorizing transient disturbances in power supplies that caused operational
malfunctions and damage to critical equipment would he required.
An industry-wide search was conducted to determine if a suitable and econom-
ical power line monitor was commerciall y available. Numerous monitors were
found. hut most of them were designed to monitor a few specific parameters.
Their costs ranged from approximately $300. for a unit that could monitor a single
parameter. to elaborate power line monitoring systems costing as much as
w ith still only a three parameter capability. There was also the problem of porta-
bility. Since many Naval shore installat~~ns are located in remote areas , both inthe United States and overseas , a several hundred pound monitoring system
would not he suitable for shipment to. or use in the field. This led to the (‘El.
development of a prototype, portable, low cost, three-phase power disturbance
monitor.
By May 1972. the first prototype monitor had been designed, fabricated, and
tested by Mr. M. N. Smith. one of the civilian emp loyees of (‘ivil Engineering
Laboratory. It was capable of detecting, categorizing, and counting the occur-
rences of anomalies in electrical power systems. The monitor could detect power
disturbances in all three phases. line-to-neutral voltages without the necessity of
differentiating the phase in which the disturbances occurred. It could continu-
ously monitor pulse transients and variations in voltage and frequency which
exceeded pre-selected levels. Whenever a preselected level had been exceeded, a
single count was registered in one of five counters which categorized the disturb-
ances as an under-voltage, an over-voltage , an under/user frequency. a low mag-
nitude impulse or a high magnitude impulse. Even a combination of disturbances
occurring simultaneously could he properly categorized and counted. The
monitor contained visual warning lights, an audio alarm, and an A(’ suIt meter.
( Ref. 7). The original prototype monitor was housed in a 22~ 14’ -ixI(P’4 inchcabinet and weighed only 48 pounds (See Figure 3— I) .
The total R&D funds associated directly with the development of the original
prototype power line monitor have been estimated at $I0.(N~
). (Ref. H .  The suc-
cessfu l completion ofthis project coincided w ith the implementation olthe Iabora
tory ’s technology transfer program. After the original prototype monitor had been
successl ’ully bench-tested at the Civil Engineering Laboratory. the decision stas
made by the Naval Communications Command to procure six additional monitors
for field-testing and utilization at various Navy shore installations, in March 1972,
2~














a Request for Proposal to design. fabricate, deliver , and test the six new monitors
was submitted to the U.S. Department of Commerce for publication in the
“Commerce Business Daily.” The successfu l bidder would be required to meet
CEL’s specifications for the monitor.
Programmed Power Inc.. a small electronics manufacturing subsidiary of
Franklin Electric Company. decided to submit a proposal and bid for the contract.
The company had recently started operations in Menlo Park. California and had
undertaken an extensive research and development project in the field of uninter-
ruptible power systems. They had also performed some preliminary R&D on
power line monitors, with the thought of possibly marketing them in the future .
Programmed Power was the successful bidder, and in June 1972 . received the
contract for six monitors. The contract called for delivery of the units by Sep-
tember of that year, and for the performance testing to be conducted at the Civil
Engineering l.ahoratot’y during October. The total amount of the contract was
$22,479, or $3,749 .50 for each of the six supplied monitors.
Transferring the Technology of the Monitor
While waiting for delivery of the new monitors from Programmed Power. CEL
field-tested the original prototype at the Naval Station, Rota, Spain, and the
Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory. Panama City. Florida. Both field evaluations
were totally successful. Realizing that the monitor had potential widespread ap-
plication for the Navy. CEL issued a complete technical note, describing the
monitor and its capabilities in June 1972. The initial distribution of the technical
note was to all Naval Facilities Engineering Command activities and the Defense
Documentation Center in Washington. D.C.
Based upon the enthusiastic response from the Navy civil engineering commun-
ity. CEL made the decision to make the monitor a primary candidate in their
technology transfer program. In August. 1972, a press release was sent out offer-
ing to make the results of the researc h and development efforts on the monitor
available for use by private industry . The following note appeared in the “En-
gineering News Letter” section of the September II. 1972 edition of ELEC-
TRONICS M A G A Z I N E :
Power Line Monitor From the Navy
Tired of wondering what your power line is doing. or for that matter, isn ’t
doing? If so, you may be interested in a low-cost, 3-phase power line
monitor that keeps an eye on the output of such supplies. The monitor
checks for both over and under-voltage and freq~’ency. and positive or nega-tive pulse transients from SO to 600 volts of pulse duration of from I micro-
second to 16 milliseconds. The Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory has
made the results of this researc h and development effort available: for
further information write: Utilization Officer. L02. Naval Civil Engineering
Laboratory, Port Hueneme, Calif. 93403.
The response to that magazine article was overwhelming. Within a week the
Civil Engineering Laboratory had received 71 requests for information about the
monitor. By the end of March, 1973 . the laboratory had received a total of 177
separate information requests from private industry, other military services , gov-
ernmental agencies. universities, hospitals. 36 state agencies . and 14 different
countr ies.
Meanwhile. Programmed Power Inc. made the decision to develop a monitor
suitable for commercial application. The company improved C El’s basic design
and introduced their Model 3200 (See Figure 3—2) . As could have been predicted.
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WE A R E  PROUD ‘10 NUMBER AMONG OUR VALUED CUSTOMERS . . .
Aetna Life & Cuualty NASA—,Johnson Spec. Center
Aiumw~um Company of America NASA—l.wglsy Research CanterAmerican Broadcasting Company NASA— Marshall Space Flight Center
American Microsystems National Accelerator LM,Orabry
Arizona Stats University National Bureau of Standards
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Bell Canada New York Timsa
Bill Helicopter Pacific Northwest Bell
Blue Cross Aasocistion Palm Beach City Data Processing
9NR (Canada) Paioe Community Hospital
Bolt. Bererteli a Newman Philco-Ford Corporation
Bowling Green Stats University Portland General Electric
Brookhaven National Laboratory Pratt & Whitney Mcrsft
Bunker Ramo Corporation Privy Councif of Canada
Bunker Awno, Eats Division PRO Electronics
Burlington Engineering Randolph Engineering
Burroughs Corporation Rental E lectronics
Canadian Overseas T.lecommunl- Rich Inc .
cations Corporation St. Regis Paper Company
Canadian Bank of Commerce Scan Data Corporation
Centeen Corporation Port of Seattle
Chandler Leasing Corporation A. 0. SmIth Company
Chemical Abstracts Service Stanford Research institute
Control Data Corporation Stanford University
E. i. du Pont Summit Radio Corporation
Eastman Kodak Teledyne-Inst
E C P M  Teleawltc’er Corporation
Electro Rents Texaco, Inc.
Elektro Ziegler tGermwy) Texas instruments
Empresa Brasiielra do Telecommuni- Thatcher Glass Manufacturing
cacoes. S.A. Tymsitara, Inc.
Emery At Freight Union Carbide Corporation
Ford Motor Company U.S. Aw Force Academy
Four-Phase Systems Inc. U.S. Army. Anniston Depot
OTEiinfoimation Systems U.S. Army, Ft. Huachuca
GTE/I.ankurt Electric U.S. Army, MERDC
General Motors Properties U.S. Army. Red River Depot
General Motors Proving Grounds U.S. Army Security Agency
Hams Trust a Savings B,w* U.S. Defense Electronics Supply Ctr.
Hatlord National Bank a Trust Comç, eny (Pt Mugu At Station )
Heroutes. Inc. U.S. Navy Air Station North talend
HiwI.tt Packard U.S. Navy CM Engineering Laboratory
HoI*nan-LaRocha U.S. Navy Pupal Sound Shipyard
Honeywell Inc. U.S. Navy Subic Bay Torpedo Station
Houglies Atcrall U.S. Navy, WeahisvFacEngCom
IBM U.S. Department of Commerce (NESS )
ldenllcon U.S. Department of the Interior
industrial Nucieonics (Bureau of Mines)
Kichens of Sara Lee U.S. Department of Stat.
Efi Lily 4 Company Univac
McDonnell-Douglas University of Michigan
Medical Center Company Wellaco Data Corporaiion
M*opoil~.wi LIIS In.urwce Western E lectricMinisterlo do 1.~snds. S.A. Westinghouse ElectricState of Minnesota ISO Wisconsin Electric




sales of the monitor totaled $454,000 and the 1975 sales forecast predicts close to
SI million. Programmed Power now offers a comp lete range of monitors to both
the domestic and international markets (See figure 3—3). The company currently
employs fifteen people, six directly as a result of the monitor. By 197$ , when
Programmed Power expects to enter the uninterniptible power systems market on
a fairly large scale, employment is expected to reach 110 people.
Benefits Derived from Transferred Technology of the Monitor
The economic b~neflts of CEL’s transfer of the monitor technology to Pro-grammed Power Inc. are obvious and the company acknowledges that CEL was
responsible for its entry into monitor production. (Ref. 9). Power line monitors
have constituted the bulk of the company ’s business since its formation and is
responsible for its growing work force.
The positive impact that C El’s transfer of the monitor technology will have on
the country ’s economy as a whole can also be estimated . Utilizing the economic
concept of the multiplier effect, it can be shown that a $10,000 research and
development effort by the Navy will have led to the creation of ar’ estimated
$1,650,000 worth of additional goods and services by the end of 1975. If the
Navy’s R&D expenditure is considered to be the “initial investment ,” then the
resultant “multiplier” will have been 165—an excellent return by any measure ,
particularly in these days of economic uncertainty. (Ref. 10).
The direct savings to the Federal Government users of the monitor as a result
of its being commercially available are significant. The original six power line
monitors purchased by the Civil Engineering Laboratory cost $3,749.50 each. The
price of the same monitors fell to $2 ,995 when Programmed Power Inc. went into
full-scale commercial production. Since then, the military services and other Fed-
eral Agencies have purchased approximately 35 of the monitors. If a conservative
cost savings figure of $600 per unit is used, more than twice the initial $10,000
R&D costs have been realized to date.
Although CEL’ s development of a low cost , versatile power line monitor was
initiated to fulfill a Navy need created by varying quality of world-wide electrical
power supplies , the current fuel shortage and related energy crisis in the United
States have increased industry ’s demand for power monitoring devices. The
power-generating problem with its feared consequences of power outages .
brownouts, voltage dips, transients, and frequency variations is worrying industry
and rightfully so. According to Mr. Lee Cooper, President of Programmed Power
Inc., “Last year’s fuel and energy crunch woke up a lot of people in the elec-
tronics and computer industries. They found out that much to their dismay. they
can no longer take for granted what comes out of that electrical socket in the
wall. ” (Ref. II).
In a rec’~nt article by Mr. C. P. Tsung, a highly qualified expert in electricalpower consumption, the author states , “Brownouts will be a fact of life for an
indefinite period of time to come. ” Mr. Tsung further reports that from a recent
survey concerning the effects of voltage reductions, it was discovered that during
brownouts , poor and unreliable operations were experienced with elevators and
their controls , monitoring equipment , escalators , communication equipment, air
conditioning equipr.tent, and a wide variety of motors , computers . and other
business machines. Particularly sensitive equipment, such as electronic data
processing computers , production controls, and medical diagnostic instruments .
are affected by even slight voltage variations , and probably should be removed
from service when supply voltages do not range within specified requirements.
(Ref. 12). Imagine the expense involved when a tec hnician spends hours attempt-
ing to debug a computer malfunction when the culprit was not the machine but the
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power supply: or the consternation of an executive making crucial corporate
decisions on computer generated data that may be erroneous; or a doctor’s fear
that critical medical monitoring instruments may malfunction because of power
problems. The mon itor can detect and/or indicate solutions for many of these
problems.
Conclusion
The power line monitor is just one example of how Navy R&D effort s, com-
bined with an aggressive technology transfer program such as that at the Navy ’s
Civil Engineering Laboratory, are benefiting society and returning public divi-
dends from defense research dollars.
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The research application effort in the Forest Serv ice was started some 75 years
ago. Somehow from the 20s to 1972 we lost s ight of the fact that we had the
responsibility of getting our research applied. Somewhere in that period we
started talking to libraries and peers rather than user groups. Back in about 1972
the General Accounting Office did an audit of Forest Service research and as it
came out it looked as if we were not getting any research applied. Therefore
renewed effort was begun to get the research applied. From then on we had the
challenge to see that the information from the Forest Service Research was
moved out of the laboratories and journals and into the hands of’ the people who
need it to help them solve problems.
The initial effort was to hire the CRUSI( group to look at the Forest Service
apparatus. The next step was to formulate a Washington Office Steering Commit-
tee. The committee was made up of the three branches of the Forest Service
which are Research , State and Private Forestry. and National Forest Systems. In
1972 this committee originated a national workshop on Research Implementation
which was conducted in Atlanta. Georgia. As a result of this research implemen-
tation workshop they looked at se veral problems within the administration of
research, and within the administration of the Forest Service in particular, in
regard to application research findings. They came up with about 28
recommendations—most of which have been put into effect. This was a week long
workshop. Over 100 people attended. Most of the attendees were from the Forest
Service. Some of the findings of the workshop resulted in a new chapter to the
Forest Service Manual and Handbook which now covers the policies and
service-wide responsibilities for research implementation. For the first time it sets
out that there will he field responsibilities for researc h implementation and coor-
dination. The Forest Service is also revising its researc h program section to cover
responsibilities , roles, and implementation of research results. We organized a
Washington Office Task Force to develop a uniform service-wide publication
system because we realized fully that one of the important means of communica-
tions is through a publication process . This task force has submitted a draft report
to the Chief of Staff.
Also in 1973 a National Research Information Service Advisory position to the
Deputy Chief of Research was established. I became that. I was at that time
working with the Northeastern Forest Experiment Station on information serv-
ices work and I had a one-half responsibility for this national assignment.
My responsibility at the Northeast Station was to stimulate special activ it ies
that would lead toward better or more rapid application of researc h findings. This
responsibility led to the development of’ a pilot project on packaging research for
specific audiences. The success of this endeavor has generated interest in the
packaging process for research applications. We were able to take a hit of re-
searc h that one of our scientists had on decay and discoloration of trees and by
unique packaging through illustration, simple slide presentations, we were able to
get the message out far beyond where he had been able to reach with 100 technical
publications. As a result of that we were given a responsibility to develop a
national guide that other scientists could utilize in packaging their research. This
guide is now available.
Each of the eight regional statio ns has an editorial and publication branch. But
out in the regions and areas (there are two areas of the Forest Service and ten
regions) there is no one responsible for taking the research information and put-
ting it into language that the user can understand and use.
We have taken a series of publications which were originally entitled “What ’s
New in Research in the West ” and expanded that to “What ’s New in Research” .
It covere d about four stations to exp lain what was happening at those stations so
that a practitioner could understand it. If he wants additional information he
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know s where to go to get it. We have a similar publication “Forest Research
News for the South” which covers two areas.
Our research administrat ion in the Washington office has been working with
personnel to amplify and clarify the research grade evaluation guide to provide
recognition to implementation efforts by scientists. We are trying to tackle the
reward system.
The Chief and staff are working with the Extension Service to establish joint
locations of extension foresters and Forest Service specialists at research centers
and land grant universities , whenever feasible. on a person-to-person basis for the
transfe r of research information.
We l’ ivc reorganized our experiment stations and for the first time we have a
position which has direct responsibility for research implementation. We call it an
Ass istant Director (AD) for program planning and application. He is a key staff
officer in the station. We had a workshop for these ADs for planning and applica-
tion in February of this year. at which we established their orientation and major
objectives by which they would tackle the application process. We have de-
~eloped a Forestry Technical Information System working with the AtomicEnergy Commission in Oak Ridge. We are going to computerize our technical
information system and storage retrieval so that the land manager, in case he has a
problem, can plug into it and get an answer.
My present position was established in 1974 in Washington , D.C. I serve as the
focal point for initiating, developing, coordinating, and facilitating programs
which will help accelerdte the application of forest service research results. 
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At C RUSK we do research on the research utili,alion process: we also tr~ toget t he knowledge we produce put to use by stu dying and improving our skil l’, in
t he dissemination and utilization D&U) process. Often. w e see in our own util i-
zation wo r k the same princi ples w e observe operating in the D&U networks we
study. Today I will he disc ii’s ’.ing both of these lesels . using as an examp le our
four-year action researc h project with the U.S. Forest Service Research Branch.
We have worked from within the research organization , so it is t his part of the
Forest Serv ice I will talk about. 1 he comments made h~ Mr. Hal Marx havecovere d how the Researc h Branch is trying to relate to the total Forest Service
organization. In our work we have stressed a model which highlights the central-
ity of the potential user of research in the wz ,I R&D—[)&U process. so we have
worked with the Research Branch in a way which puts us somewhat in the role of
an advocate for the user. However, s ince we have been constrained to work from
w ithin the Researc h Branch almost exclusivel y , the thrust of our analysis and
feedback/problem-solving work has been: what can the Researc h Branch do to
improve bou t the production of’ knowledge and the extent to which it gets used?
The ana lyses I will talk about later are geared to answering this question.
Parenthetically. I might note that researchers alwa~ seem to he more in-terest ed in such work than are the users. The reward systems ~f researc hers , andothers for that matter. are t ied up in the prod uction , not in the input .  In fact, most
of us here are researchers interested in getting otir products used. Researcher s are
more mot ivated than clients to improve utilization, and agencies such as the
Government Accounting Office do audits which heighten this motivation (the
Research Branch received an audit critical of’ its application efforts a few years
ago). The backdrop for our work, then , was an agency motivated—at least at the
top leadership level—to improve dissemination of findings, and uses to which they
arc put.
Analytically , we have been working with two important criteria in this process:
t he researchers ’ contributions to scientific knowledge, and to applications of
knowledge . The former is a necessary hut not sufficient condition b r  the latter.
As Hal Marx ’ comments might lead you to suspect, the Research Branch has
been, historically, more concerned with reaching other researchers as the primar~client for research: hut the shift is now on toward applied clients , t he natural
resource managers. We have tried to emphasize the point that a “c lient analvs i’,”
is more fruitful than trying to decide if the knowledge being produced is either
“basic ’’ or ‘‘app lied.’’ We feel that , in many cases , it is almost impossible to look
at knowledge and make a basic-applied distinction. Also. esen U the knowledge
can he c lassified as ‘‘applicable. ’’ that is no clue as to whether or not it actually
gets transmitted to and put to cont inued use by c lients who are not researchers .
I think this is enough background about our overall approach. The materials in
Figure 5—I wi ll give you more information about the proj ect itself . W hat I would
like to do now is to concentrate on two topics in turn: ( I )  the action researc h
“R&D l.ah Renewal Model” w hich we have been trying to get put into use in the
I-c ) Ic st Sers ice. and (2 ) the findings about scientif ic and app lied contribution
which are emerging from our research within this model. At the end. I w ill
ment ion some of our learnings alx~ut researc h utilization principles w hich seem tohold tr ite at both levels: ( I )  our work with our Forest Service clients, and t what
our research identifies about how they get their knowledge put t o use. I-toni what
I have heard at this meeting. I suspect that many of these principles may apply to
t he Navy situation. as well.
The R&D Laboratory Model
Ihere are four broad areas w hich we feel competent to work with in an R&D
organization, and which we have studied in the Forest Service. These are the
GOALS
To conduct a comprehensive action-research project covering the areas of:
(a) Organizational planning and goal-setting
(b) Individual satisfactions , information-processing, and other personal factors
(c) Organizational climate, leadership, functioning
(d) Production and dissemination of outputs for scientific clients and for applied clients.
Implicit in the notion of action research is a detailed problem-solving perspective for problem-
formulation, data collection, analysis, feedback , identification and group problem-solving to work on
problem areas, and finally, an evaluation of changes in the organization The overall sequence will lake
something like five years (we are four years into the process fow l
TASKS
Initial problem-formulation was done through a year’s open’ended interviewing, learning, and setting
up of an inside team - from F S Washington leadership, primarily in research , but with client represen-
tat ion as well
Data collection (year two) saw creation of a complete R&D organization questionnaire in the foi’;
areas above, and collection of data from a census of researchers and a V3 sample of research techni-
cians, with an ove all response rate of 94%. A large data reduction and multivariale analysis chore
followed, focusing on the criteria of satisfactions , scientific , and applied contribution, with some atten-
tion to reward In terms of G S Grade).
Recently we have been involved in guiding the data feedback process with small groups in each of
The eight FS research stations and the Forest Products Laboratory. The model has been one of
teaching problem-solving skills needed to derive problems from data, identify solutions, and build action
plans for them The data have served to: (1) identify predictive models for the criteria (and hence.
establish important predictors), and (2) indicate where the “tations are on the criteria and their predic-
tors, to establish priorities for problem-identification. Group discussions use these results as a spring-
board in result-validation and interpretation
Future work will center more and more in helping the system correct problems identified, and
reinforce the strengths. Prime areas for national attention are: (1) a complete look at research
applications—appropriate activities , how to measure contributions, and the reward system: (2) de-
velopment of organizational skills in the stations: (3) testing of a short form of our instrument , geared to
use as a management tool: The form will collect ratings of organizational and individual factors, plus
look directly at the effects of these factors on satisfactions and contributions.
FURTHER WORK
We have also been working Wi th a medical R&D organization in a more compact version of the
project , with an instrument based on the notion of point 3 in the paragraph above. Similar data have
also been collected in ‘an educational R&D lab by another researcher . In the future we will finish
analyses at individual, project , and location levels, and write extensively.
Figure 5—1 Summary of the CRUSK—U.S. Forest Sers ice Research Study.
focus areas listed as the rows in the model in Figure 5—2 . The areas are: ( I )  the
researc h planning process . both long and short range~ ( 2) organizational (actors:(3 ) individual factors , att itudes , mot ivations , information proce’.sing. and
background: and (4) production of knowledge, dissemination, and utilization. \Ve
did not prioritize these focus areas , nor put any predictor—criterion models on
t hem before we began to work. This may scare some social scientists: hut we
began w ith the “free” approac h because we think the criteria and the models need
to be set by an organization to meet its needs, not ours. What we are saving is t hat
all of these factors are needed to give us a mastery over what is going on in the
organi zation. hut that how the areas interrelate and what the important outcome
measures are must be spec ified by the client.
The stages in the action research process . spec ified working toward the right
across t he top of the figure . constitute a more active than normal role for the
researc her in helping his client understand and use information. Though this
process provides , we believe , more useful and used outputs . it has heightened our
Concern about factors such as long time periods in research projects , t he necessity
for team building, and the reward systems in science—all factors we will discuss
as ~‘parallels ’’ later.
In  the first stage of problem formulation, we spent a (‘nIl year sin’iply getting to
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- 1 oti’ in the coverage we were then able to provide in our survey instrument, the
predicti~c posser of our analyses. and in the ultimate usefulness of the results. ‘t he
major “data ’’ from the problem formulation year consist of open-ended group
interview’ s w ith about 3(M) persons in the Research Branch and client groups .
From this we went on into the second phase of the model , using a self-
administered survey questionnaire covering the tour areas. Many of the concepts
used were taken t’rom precedent works on research organizations . organizational
development , and dissemination and utilization. All of the concept s were . how-
ever , filtered through the realities contained in the problem formulation results .
and through a Forest Service project monitoring team, in order to insure that we
were asking relevant questions. In analysis we have concentrated on criteria
dealing with reactions (and satisfactions) with the organization, contributions to
knowledge and applications , and increasingly in recent months, the notion of the
reward system. We find that interest in these criteria varies within the organiza-
tion. We have discovered that there is more interest at the top of the organization
w ith issues such as research application, while individual researchers are more
concerned with the organizational conditions which help or hurt their work : and
contributions of either type. Thus , we have had to keep a wide range of informa-
tion in the feedback data and report s we have provided for stations , and in the
meetings we have held for problem solving based on the results.
What happens during feedback and problem solving? The following phases
seem to cover most of the work done separately in the various researc h stations.
I. Orientation of the client to our perspectives , and of us to their current
problems: initial meetings with leadership were used, too.
2. P resentation of findings dealing with the criteria and with factors which
relate strongly to the criteria in nation-wide analyses. Data are always pre-
sented in a way w hich allow them to compare themselves with the rest of the
system, and in addition, by important levels (e.g.. job sta tu s)  within their
local organization
3. t ’a/idat ion of our findings against the collected experiences of groups from
the station. In cases of disagreement between the clients and the data, we
exp lored the reason for the discrepancy, and usually came out agreeing with
t he clients ’ judgments.
4 . Problc ’n, formulation , using the data and discussion as stimuli for the group
to use in brainstorming sessions with the goal of identifying real, continuing
problems in that station.
5. Solution re( ’ i) mnien thltion . using continuing brainstorming to come up with
alternative solutions , evaluate the alternatives , and finish with a list of rec-
ommendat ions for action. The recommendations usually went to station
leadership for reactions and implementation.
Our role in the content of this work was greatest during the first two steps , and
gase way to increased activity with the proues.s used by t he meeting participants
during the later phases. Va lidation was a particularly important step. since it was
here , in the group setting. that individuals came to feel they understood our
concept s and could relate to them. In addition, they had the necessary chance to
locate problems in the data or analysis. Several kinds of problems were identified
in various locations:
I. (‘onditions had changed since the data were collected. Here our desire to
collect complete data and do comprehensive analyses worked against our
desire to he timel y. In addition, the Forest Service told us in no uncertain
terms t hat the stations could not hold still, or consent to he control groups
for us .
4 1
2. We had not asked the right questions. ‘rhis was particularly true in cases
where local conditions differed from those true nationwide. Were we to do
t he research again, for example, we would probably put more emphasis on
the financial aspects of research projects. Where we did have an area cov-
ered, however , we found that the items seemed much more on target than in
the average survey. This we attribute completely to the amount of work
which went on during the first year , and to the fact that items were not added
solely from the social scientist ’s view of how the world (and the concepts
working in it) ought to be.
3. Our analyses weren’t complete. We found that our clients gave us valuable
clues for variables which needed to he considered for qualifying conditions,
etc. The fact that they themselves are researchers helped no end here . The
comments added both to the predictive power in our revised analyses . and to
the utility of the results—primaril y since the client could now have more
confidence in the findings.
Our general principle running through all of our work is that of direct psycholog-
ical involvement of the client throughout the process , and of direct interaction
between client and researcher at all phases. The “action potential” of the results is
much greater if the client feels he understands and somehow “owns” the study.
its concepts, and its findings. On the other hand, the client needs help with the
process through which the findings get turned into recommendations for support-
ing good things or changing bad ones. These feelings of ownership are particularly
crucial at leadership levels , since these provide a legitimate entry to the staff—and
the staff in turn insure s that leadership cannot ignore the study and its recommen-
dations.
I think this covers the process of our work sufficiently. The next question
involves what we’ve learned from the research. I ha~e selected three analyses forattention here, taken from the data for all Forest Service Research stations com-
bined.
Some Findings
We will be looking at analyses of the two kinds of contribution researchers can
make: that to scientific krn’w ledge itself, and that to applications. We have found
that indices of the two kinds of contribution do correlate positively—researchers
who are contributing to science also tend to cont ribute to applications. Beyond
this , however , there are different predictive models for scientific and applied
contribution, *
The scientific contribution index is the vertical scale in Figure 5—3. Groups
have been defined by the computer , as a function of high-low splits on a set of
predictors , so as to maximally predict the criterion of contribution by creating
groups (in a non-symmetric manner—the technique is called Automatic Interac-
tion Detection). Notice one thing about the strategy we are using—we have not
brought back to the client any regression or correlation analyses. We have found
that it is difficult even for researchers to derive action implications from correla-
tional findings. They seem to need /ei c/ s on defined variables for groups of iden-
tified type and size.
The analysis shows us that the highest contributors to science in the Forest
Service Research Branch are research team Project Leaders who are also “self
start ing.” in that they get a greater than average amount of stimulation to perform
Bot h measures equally weigh appropriate questionnaire responses in three areas: ,iumber of written
outputs in Ia’,i five years . number of events attended, and opinions about ~ontrj hut ion,
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Plotted by Means on the Index
Figure 5—3 “A.I. D. ” Analysis of the Scientific Contribution Index (Data from
identlats and P1’s)
well from their own work, ideas , and curiosity. They are also more “cognitively
complex.” that is . they prefer to handle many aspects of a problem at once, rather
than working on one facet at a time in a linear fashion. The combination of these
three factors , then, defines the highest group. making up about 13 per cent of the
researchers in the organization. Scientists, as opposed to Project Leaders, can
“compensate ” for their lower role in the organizational structure by having a
Ph.D.. being more active in inter-project and inter-displinary collaborative re-
search. mrncl having a good scientific information exchange environment. The
scientific information environment and feelings of high challenge in work and
dedicat ion to work help the non-doctorate Scientists. On the bottom in terms of
scientific contribution are Scientists without a doctorate who say their scientifc
information environment is bad. Organizational factors, then, seem critical for the
scientific contribution of scientists hut only personal cognitive and motivation
factors are important to the contribution of the researc h leaders. (Most of whom
were probably selected for their job because they had these characteristics.)
t 
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In feedback we would compare the percentages in each of these nine groups
from the nation-wide data with percentages in the station. We would also look at
the mean score s of the nine groups in the station, again compared with the na-
tional data. If a station found it had more researchers than average in a low group.
and/or a lower contribution score for that group, then it would have an idea of
which factors to work on for change. For example, if 20 per cent of a station ’s
research Scientists showed up in the non- Ph.D.—poor scientific information
group, then that station would have a clue that it might need to improve the
information environment for these persons. We “mi ght” because this finding
would still need to be discussed and validated by the experiences of the group.
the next example. in Figure 4. covers the index of applied contribution. It is in
a different form for ease of understanding, but it was produced by the same
analytic procedure as was used above. What we are saying here is . and I would
challenge you to think about your own R&D organization. ~ia1 applied contribu-tion is affected most dramatically by the extent researchers think their organiza-
tion supports their efforts in linking with clients. The support measure includes
perceived pressure from inside and outside the research team to get application;
the extent the supervisor pushes application; and the rewards perceived for such
work, also. What the three plots show is that the effects of support are positive for
all three groups, though a bit more important for Project Leaders who get a great
deal of stimulus from client problems. Client stimulus makes a difference, as does
HIGH
The 11 groups account for 32% of
the variation in the index.
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Figure 5-4 Summary of the “A.LD.” Analysis of the Applied Contribution Index .
(Data from Scientists and PLa)
44
job status ~f the researcher is high in getting this stimulus from clients. So
, job
status , stimulation from clients , and a overall organizational support , are the
important factors to know about in predicting applied cont ’ibutions. The support
dimension, in particular, has come in for a lot of discussion during feedback as a
controll ing factor in the amount researchers get active in applications. This brings
us to the final analysis.
Just how do the two contribution factors relate to rewards researchers receive?
To answer this we divided researchers into five groups, as a function of their
scores on the two contribution measure s, and then compared the average G.S.
Grades of the groups, after controlling for background and experience factors.
The results are in Figure 5.
140 - (17)
I: ~~ :: i
(13)





GAP 1 GAP 5 GRP 3 GRP 2 GAP 4
low on Moderate Lo Scmenti- High Scienti- High
both on both tic, high tic, low on both
Applied Applied
FIVE SCIENTIFIC AND APPLIED CONTRIBUTION GROUPS
‘Mew,s adluefed to remove effects of background factors kited below




Level of .ejcation ¶ 5 1  0001 35 001
Y.ws sv~e ,isacalion completed 80 .0001 4.2 .000’V e s  in Forest Srvc. research 5 0001 2.3 05
Etpjatdy of ai~usI.d news d I 4.680 4,242F 68 7 1
_ 0001
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What we see is that, for research team Project Leaders , those who are high in
applied contribution are about one haifa G.S. Grade lower than their colleagues ,
regardless of where they are on scientific contribution. Compare groups one and
three: the only difference between them is that group three is high on applications,
while both are low in scientific contribution. Here group three is half a grade
lower, even though, objectively, they are at least contributing in one area. More
serious is the cut taken by group four as compared with group two. Project
Leaders in group four are high in both kinds of contribution, but they are still half
a grade lower than their peers who are high only in scientific contribution. The
reward system for Project Leaders, then, appears to give a negative reward for
applications. For Scientists , the picture is not so bad—we see a general positive
trend for G.S. Grade as the Scientist becomes high in either area and finally both.
During data feedback, discussion immediately turns to the big issue: why
do(’ .sIf ’ ( the organization reward applications work of Project Leaders? As we ’ve
sa id earlier, the Forest Service has been concerned in the past with building its
scientific legitimacy, academic credibility, building laboratories close to univer-
sity campuses. and so on. Reputation building is a necessary step: but, what we
are seeing is that rewards are not yet ready for the next step which the organiza-
tion is trying to take. We suspect that a great deal of work will be needed to
change the peer evaluation system , and the government guidelines for evaluating
science.
Parallels
I want to close with some parallels I have seen at the two levels we ta lked about
earlier: the use of our knowledge aho~t researc h production and utilization in theForest Service , and what we see in the Forest Service as they try to get their
knowledge put to use. As I said, some of these seem to apply to the Navy setting
as well.
First , of course is the reward problem. It seems endemic—as much of a diffi-
culty in the Forest Service as in academics in rewarding efforts to get research
applied. It seems that the people in charge of research organizations are only
beginning to move in the direction of emphasizing application—and more so in the
government than in academics : but neither group has taken the next required step
of putting rewards where their verbalizations are .
A second parallel is that problem of maintaining a long-time sequence of proj-
ects. I have indicated that the Forest Service project is a four to five year effort .
We have had difficulty maintaining our momentum as a researc h team. Social
Scientists are geared to work on short range things. Very few of us are psycholog-
ically keyed to not having an answer for the next four years. This . ot’ course . ties
immediately back into the reward system problems. All of these things interact.
We see the same difficulties in the Forest Service: if we think a five year time
sequence is bad—what do you do if you want to study the complete regeneration
of the forest? It may take a generation before the project is done, creating a
motivation and momentum problem. So both of us (we and the Forest Service)
seem to have problems in terms of time scale; I haven’t heard this mentioned as so
great a problem in Navy R&D, however.
Third, is another time problem parallel . that of turn-around time. Our analysis .
being as detailed as it was . took something like a year or a year and one-half. As 1
said, the organization moved out from under us. In the Forest Service, we hear
the same thing. We hear clients complaining that. “By the time you guys came
back with your solution to the problem, we had simply flipped a coin for a solution
and went on. That was last year’s problem. This year’s problem is x , y or z. What
do you have to tell me on that?” It seems that researchers are still tied to the .01
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level or even the .00 1 level of significance before they will say anything, even
though the real world often makes decisions on the flip of a coin. Clients are
saying to us all the time, “Why don’t you give me a 60-40 guess?” If you stop and
think about it many of us researchers change hats. We take off the conical peak
hat of the academician and put on the hard hat of the consultant. We will go out
into the real world and we will help people. What we do when we do that, is forget
the data and fire from the hip. We use our hunches , which are educated guesses.
based on what we think is going on. We are not staking our reputation on a
probability level. (‘lients are asking us to do more of this , even within our re-
search projects. With both systems we have some problems doing this. This is
probably true for the type of research that you do also.
Fourt h is familiarity with the client. This is a crucial factor in the success of
research, primarily, I maintain, because of the fact that research must be designed
to meet the needs of the clients. It is also required to help solve problems. I have a
rule of thumb. About the time that I feel you could go to work as a researcher for
that organization, or about the time you go to a meeting and are mistaken for an
employee of the organization, then that point in time you are at the level where
you can begin to make some positive inputs to that organization. Before that it is
best to be quiet.
Fifth is the problem of the R&D to c lient ratio. This ratio brings in the need for
linkers and person multipliers. These concept s have also been discussed during
this meeting. Our project used two people. On the average there has been one
scientist man year on the project. There are about 1,000 researchers in the Forest
Service R&D community; but at least 40,000 to 50,000 who could be potential
users of the information they produce. That ratio is very large. Something needs
to be put into the middle. We all have learned that people make better people
multipliers than impersonal media—both we and the Forest Service are beginning
to move into the area of training other people to translate knowledge and pass it
along. The Department of Agriculture started the extension concept ; but some-
how there has been a problem in carrying the concept over into the Forest
Service.
The sixth parallel is that we all have to learn that researchers cannot take all of
the blame for lack of use of knowledge . Again it goes back to what people are
rewarded for. We have had a few reward problems in that we are demanding a fair
amount of time from people out in the field. Time was needed to derive solutions
based on what we had found, but they may not get rewarded for giving us this
time . The Forest Service researchers have the same problem. It doesn’t say in a
Forester ’s job description; “one of the things you will do. and get rewarded for, is
listening to the researchers. ” I don’t know of any body ’s job description in any
agency which is written this way.
Seventh is the parallel of organizational support , the thing that we saw was so
important in applied contribution. Social science is still overly concerned with the
academic image and rewards researchers for contributions made in narrow scien-
tific specialties , as judged by scientists themselves. R&D organizations seem to
be unable to break the mold, provide support for their staff, and put pressure on
the larger academic community that what the lab and its people do is valuable and
important.
The eighth parallel is one which I see in all of the systems: that is the “musical
chairs problem.” Just about the time we in our research get someone trained in
one of the stations to know what we are talking about, or just about the time that
the Forest Service research branch gets one of the people out in the regional office
trained. or just about the time you get that Navy Captain so that he knows what
you are talking about, the person is gone. The turn-around time seems to be




off because our client ratio is still 2:10(K) or so. and there are probably only ISO top
administrators in the system. u sually when people leave from a station at which
we have worked, they either go out to retirement or they go up. Many have moved
up or across to ot her stations. People that we worked with earlier are showing up
in surprisingly useful places. I suspect that this does not happen with the clients in
Forest Service research because when clients “go up ” they tend to get moved to
another region, away from the station ’s territory. In the case of the Navy, I would
suspect the problem is even more severe . We all need to think of mechanisms
which will make our application inputs “transfer-proof.”
The ninth and final point involves the need to work in teams. We need to
because we are concerned with doing good social science and with the group
processes required to get our results and model put to use. We also need team
members who “know the territory” of natural resources. The Forest Service is
also moving more to interdisciplinary teams as they come to work on more “real-
life” problems. Most researchers are too narrowly trained to be able to do justice
to the scope demanded in most “real” problems.
In conclusion. I have tried to illustrate the process we have used, together with
some of our findings from the Forest Service project. Both what we have learned
in the process and about the Forest Service point to a series of parallels. The
parallels stress the importance of providing organizational conditions and sup-
ports (particularly rewards) which permit researchers to contribute to both sci-
ence and application at the same time. The dual contribution makes tremendous
demands on researcher and organization alike, and means we have much to learn
about being timely, involved, broadbased. and relevant to our clients.
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The Presidential lnternships in Science and Engineering Program was initiated
in 1971 under the administrative control of the National Science Foundation, with
funding being provided by the Department of Labor.
This program enabled unemployed or underemployed scientists and engineers
holding advanced degrees to work for a year at Federal Research and Develop-
ment laboratories. A one year nonrenewable stipend of up to $7,000 per year was
granted to each intern with the laboratory providing matching funds or. in many
cases , larger amounts .
The internships were intended to help the scientists and engineers to broaden
their work experience, thereby facilitating their transition to future jobs needed by
society. To this end, a total of 557 scientists and engineers were granted intern-
ships at 72 laboratories before the program was concluded in the spring of 1973.
It is unfortunate that no system for monitoring and evaluating the program was
established before it was started . At the time the program concluded, little was
known about its success or failure in accomp lishing its objectives.
In late 1973, and early 1974 , Iwo naval officers who were enrolled in a program
leading to a Masters Degree in Management at the U.S. Naval Postgraudate
School, undertook a study of the internship program. ’ This report describes and
summarizes their thesis and their effort in preparing it.
The Purpose of the Study
The study was initiated in an effort to measure the effectiveness of the Presi-
dential lnternships in Science and Engineering Program. The specific objectives
of the study were as follows:
I. To determine if the program helped the interns to obtain employment in the
science or engineering fields.
2. To determine if the interns provided the laboratories with a specialized
talent.
3. To determine how long it took the interns to become productive members of
their laboratories .
4. To determine what effect the internship had on influencing the interns to
seek ~i doctorate.
5 . To determine if the interns’ salaries and advancement patterns were equiva-
lent to those of their contemporaries .
6. To determine if the internship increased the interns ’ capability for technol-
ogy trans fer.
7. to  determine how technical information was transferred between the interns
and other members of t he laboratory , and to exam ine how information v~asobtained by laboratory members.
K . To determine if there were identifiable barriers to the transfe r of technology
between the interns and other members of the laboratory.
9. To determine some of the characteri stics of the interns involved. 01’ particu-
lar interest are those characteristics that can be associated with the linker
and sta h,li,cr concepts described by Creighton. Jolly. and Denning. (Ref. 2).
Itt . 1o determine if specific intern char acteristics were related to their perform-
ance at the laboraior~- .
‘( ater . ( harks F. ancJ Korsmo,Thornas 14.. Masters Thesis . A Studs of the Presidential Internship in
Si~tenee m d  I- ngineering. June 1974. Ct~pies are asa i lable from the I)clensv I)ocumentation ( enter.( .imeron Station. Alesandna. V irg in ia _2 1 14 .
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The Background for the Study
During the period in which the Presidential lnternships in Science and En-
gineering Program ~sas initiated , highly qualified young scientist s and engineers
were endur ing a particularly high unemployment rate in the airframe industry. Dr.
Edward F. l)a~ id, Jr.. Sc ience Advisor to the President. commented that “t heseunemployed people could provide a unique source of skills and resources, much
of which was dL~ eloped at tax payers ’ expense in colleges . universities , and var i-ous laboratories .” In a sense, these people represented a vital national resource
that w~is not being effectively utilized.
Concurrently. t here sa~ a grow ing need throughout the country for research in
such areas as pollution control , tras h disposal. management and integration of
large projects , and the nuclear field in areas as diverse as new power systems or
cr iminal and medical laboratories. The internship program could prov ide tempo-
rar~ empIo~ ment for scientist s and engineers , expose the trainees to both theproblems and the capabilities of government research and development institu-
tions , and send technological specialists into the mainstream of government units
wh ich had previously not been able to afford such ~.,pert ise.
It made a great deal of sense for the federal government to protect its interests
by devising means to utili,e the skills that it had helped to develop. One of the
main t hrusts of this study was to evaluate the accomp lishments of the internship
program as a means of utili,ing these skills .
An essent ial ke~ to t he succe ss of this program would be the ability of thelaboratories and interns involved to transfe r technical information and knowledge
from one to t he other. Technology transfe r has been defined by Gruber and
\ larquis as “the acceptance by a user of a practice common elsewhere , or it may
be a different application of a given technique designed originally for another
use. ’ ( Ref. 3. p. 255—fm ). An example is the widespread adaptation of many of the
space program developments , suc h as teflon and sub-miniaturization of electronic
components. to commercia l applications.
If one accept s the principle that a considerable amount of the nation ’s researc h
and development effort involved devising different uses of existing ideas, or
further sophistication of knoss- n concepts . t hen it follows that an important facet of
researc h and development is the capahiltt~ to discover and transfe r what hasalread~ been learned from one user to another.
Anot her important factor to he considered regarding the internship program is
t he capability of the program participants to develop and utilize innovative con-
cepts. Burnett calls innovation “a new t hought . behavior, or thing which is differ-
ent from existing forms. ’’ (Ref. I. page 71. It is certainly not difficult to conclude
t hat the solution to such relatively recent areas of public concern such as pollution
contro l and trash disposal. w hich had not been generally recognized as high prior-
it~ nationa l problems in previous generations , would require some inno~ ati~ e
techniques.
Creighton. Jolls . and Denning ( Ref. 2) have suggested that certain characteris-
tics of some indis iduals would render them more effective in accomplishing the
t echnology transfe r mission than others. They went on to describe those indi’.idu-
als w ho exhibit the traits of a gatekeeper (one who holds the strategic position in
terms of the flow of knowledge from source to application (Ref. 4 , pp. 7— I I).
irino~ator (early adapter of an innos ation). early knower (one who consistent l~ta kes initiative (in his own behalf to seek out scientific knowledge and derive
use ful learnings therefrom ( Ref. 4. pp. 7—41 ) . and opinion leader (the individual
from whom others see k information and advice) .
lndi~ iduats who display a high degree of conformance to this description havebeen termed by Creighton. Jolly. and Denning as linkers while those who show
fairl~ little conformance vsere called stahiliiers . They further hs- poihesized thatt here would be a relationship between the output efficiency uti l i /ation of research
and t he behavioral characteristics of the indiv iduals in the user ach y ilies.
If linkers and stab ilizers could he identified in the intern group. it would he of
interest to analyie their performance characte ristics , as iew-ed by their super-
isorS . in order to sec if there vvere any significiant differences and if one group or
the ot her ach ieved superior performance results. Identif ication of such relation-
ships , if the~ ex isted , cou ld he of value to the laboratories and others who areconcerned vv ith acquiring services of people to accomplish research and develop-
menl ta s ks .
It would be presumptuous however, to assume that the interns themsel v es had
complete control of their destinies , and it should he recognized that the nature of
t he lahorators itself would have some impact on the ability of the interns to
function as either linkers or stabilizers . It , for example. a laboratory had estab-
lished policies that would serve as harriers to the adoption of technological iflflO-
vat ion. it ~ ould perhaps he difficult for a linker oriented indiv idual to realize hisfull potential. Barriers , in this context , could include such things as failure of the
laboratories to encourage and reward innovative suggestions . litilure of super-
v isors to recogn ize and accept their subordinates ’ ability to develop useful new
concepts . failure of the organization to maintain adequate channels of cornmuni—
cation w hereby employees can readily bring innovative suggestions to their
supervisors ’ attention , and many others. It is also likely that some factors that
may appear as harriers or demt.~t iv a to rs  to some individuals may not have the
sa me detrimental effect on others.
W ith these thoughts in mind, the study was launched in quest of information
t hat would prove relevant to the concepts discussed above.
Description of the Study
A survey ot’ t he scientists and engineers who participated in the internship
program was conducte d. It was antici pated t hat some of the interns and super-
v isors would no longer he employed at the internship laboratories. Therefore . it
was a lmost certain from the outset that it would he impossible to survey all interns
or supervisors or even to obtain a trri l~ random sampling of the original popula-tion.
With these limitations in mind the sample population was selected f rom the
laboratories that participated in the internshi p program. The sample w its not
random in that it was limited to those laboratories in the California irea . or
laboratories with a large number of interns , and/or E)epartment of t)efense
laboratories that could be contacted by Autovon telep hone. These limitations
were imposed as a method of minimizing the cost of the study and facilitating a
quick response. The lack of random sample vio lates a prime requirement tor
stat istical significance implications to the total population. Therefore, the study
team was able to apply the statisti cal measure s only to the population of the
sample.
A self-designating questionnaire was developed based upon a research of’ the
literature which examined the characteristics and qualities of the linker. The
se lf-designation method was adopted as an effec t ive hut economic method of
identifying the effectiveness of the program in that the individual’s percept ions are
w hat act ua ll~ affect his behavior. (Ref ’ . 5. p. 2 16).
F ifteen of the 72 laboratories involved in the internship program were selected.
t hese laboratories employed 137 of the 557 interns. Questionnaires were sent to







Location Sets Mailed Intern Supervis or
Cold Regions Research and
Development Laboratory 4 4 3
Brookhaven National Laboratory 15 9 9
Franklord Arsenal 3 2 1
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 9 4 0
National Aerospace Medical
Research Laboratory 2 1 2
National Center for
Earthquake Research 3 3 1
Naval Electronics
Laboratory Center 8 5 6
Naval Missile Ce. (er
Point Mugu 4 1 2
Naval Ordnance Laboratory 2 1 2
Naval Research Laboratory 44 30 0
Naval Ship Research and
Development Center 6 4 4
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 12 8 0
Pacific Southwest Forest and
Range Experiment Station 2 1 2
Picatinny Arsenal 10 6 9
Western Regional Research
Laboratory 12 8 9
TOTALS 136 87 50
A number of the interns and their supervisors were personally interviewed by a
t~ searc h team member. The interviews clarified unexpected responses and iden-h u e d  resu lts of the program not examined by the questionnaire .
Questionnaires
tw o  separate questionnaires were distributed , one to the interns and the other
to the superv isor in the laboratory under whose guidance the intern worked.
The intern questionnaire was composed of 29 semantic differential questions .
directt ’d tovs ard identifying the effectiveness of the program, and three open-
ended questions dealing with biographical data.
A second questionnaire in two parts was intended to determine the professional
atmosp here of the Iahorato~ es as it affected the attitud es and performance ot theinterns and to determine t he superv isor ’s eva luations ot the interns ’ c haracteris-
tics and productivity . Fac h question was assoc ialei~ wi th one or more questions in
t he intern questionnaire.
Results Matched to Specific Objectives
This section matches responses to the questionnaire with each of the objectives
of t he study. The objective is stated , a summary of the findings pertaining to the
objective is given. This is followed by a summary of the responses to each ques-
lion which contributed to that objective.
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-( ) bj et ti m e I. I o determine if the program helped the interns to obtain
employment in the science or engineering fields .
Seventy-e ight percent of the interns strongly agreed or agreed that the intern-
ship helped them obtain employment in their fields and 7 W.  strong ly agreed or
agreed t hat the internship increased their emp loyment opportunit~ . Ninety-fourpercent of the supervisors strongly agreed or agreed that they would recommend
t he interns b r  employment. Only one st ipervisor disagreed.
1 he number of interns emp loyed increased from 40 hefare the internshi p to 7X
at’ter. Three of the interns went hack to school after the intcrnship while six of
t hem vv eie unemployed. The total number ot interns not holding jobs in their field
decreased from 62 before the internship to nine after. Of those six interns who
were unemployed after the internship; one had been prev iously under-employed .
tv ~ , had been employed in their field, and three had hecn in school.
( ) hjeuii e 2. To determine if the iaterns provided the laboratories with a
spec ialized talent.
Forty-eig ht percent of the interns and 4W~ of t he supervisors strongly agreed or
agreed that the interns provided the laboratory with a specialized talent. Forty-
four percent ot t he interns and 4W of the supervisors felt that the interns profes-
sional knowledge was either far greater or greater than the interns ’ contem-
poraries. Onl~ 7’ of the interns and to’ ; of the supervisors felt it was less.There vyas a moderate disagreement between the interns ’ and superv isors ’
responses regarding the interns ’ major va lue to the laboratory. The interns t’elt
more strongly that their major value was the knowledge they brought with them to
t he laboratory or their ability to develop new concepts, with 59~7~ of t he interns
se lecting one of these responses. On the other hand. SW. ; of t he supervisors
indicated that the interns ’ ability to understand and use concepts already in use at
t he laboratory or to carry out instructions given by others was the interns ’ major
va lue to the laboratory.
O/~f e e t h e 3. To determine how long i t took the interns to become productive
members of t heir laboratories
Sixty-three percent of’ t he interns and StY .; ofthe supervisors t~ lt that the interns
had become productive within two months. Only 2’; of the interns and super-
v isors felt that it took the interns longer than six months to become productive.
Thirty-nine percent of the interns and (iW of the supervisors thought that the
interns had become productive faster than most other nevv members .
Obje etim e -I. To determine what effect the internship had on influencing the
interns to seek a doctorate.
Fifty-six percent of the supervisors strongly agreed or agreed that their fahora-
tory~s policy was to encourage interns to seek advanced decrees , while to’ .; of the
supervisors disagreed with this statement.
Of t he 45 interns who did not have a doctorate prior to the internship. 3 1
indicated that the internshi p had no influence upon their desire to seek a doctorate
and that they had already decided one way or the other. Fight interns said the
program encouraged them to seek a doctorate and (‘our sa id the interns-hip dis-
couraged them.
Objet h i t  5 . b determine if the interns ’ salaries and adv ancement patterns
were equivalent to t hose of their contemporaries .
I he interns ’ and superv isors ’ responses regarding the interns ’ advancement
pattern were q~u ite similar. Twenty-nine percent of’ t he interns and 34’ .; of thesuperv isors agrt~ed or strongly agrLed that the Interns ’ advancement pattern wasbetter than their contemporaries , while 25’ ; of’ t he interns and 2W. ; of the super-
v isors disagreed or strongly disagreed w ith this supposit ion. lhe most frequent
answer chosen h~ bot h groups vs as ‘ ‘ undecided . ’’
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Sist ’, -three percent of the interns felt that their salaries ysere either higher or
much higher than their contemporaries . vs hite only W .  felt they were lovser.
() hj ~u ti i  ~. To determine if the internship increased the interns ’ capahilit~f’or tec hnolog~ transfer.Seventy-e ight percent of ’ the interns and XO’~ of the supervisors agreed or
stro ngly agreed that the internship had improved the interns ’ tec hnology transfer
capahilil~ . while IOU.; of the interns and only 2’ of the supervisors disagreed orstrong I~ disagreed vs i th this statement.Obje t hi ; e 7. To determine how technical information Was transfe rred he-
tvse ef l  the interns and other members of the laboratory and to examine how
information vs as obtained by laboratory members.
Fitly-one percent ofthe interns felt that the way in which the laboratory shared
sc ientific informatiirn was either outstanding or completely satisfactory. while
rnl~ one intern indicated that he felt the laboratory was completely unsatisfactoryin this regard . Sixty-seven percent of the interns agreed or strongly agreed that
the~ were sat isfied vs i th  the amount of information they received about what washappening at the laboratory and 6ff. ; of the supervisors either agreed or strongly
agreed t hat the top management of the laboratory was effective in keeping the
sc ientists and engineers informed about what was going on. One supervisor
strongly disagreed that his laboratory was effective in sharing information. The
negat ive responses to questions regarding the distribution of information in the
laboratories vs er e generally spread among severa l laboratories with only one re-
cei ving predominantly negative responses .
Ninety-two percent of the interns indicated that they were able to relate in
tec hnical areas with two or more other members of their laboratories , while only
one intern cou ld relate with no one. Twenty-five percent of the interns thought
they could relate with more than six other laboratory members and several of
them indicated that they could relate with anyone in the laboratory.
By far the response most frequently chosen as the most effective vsa y of ex-
c hanging technical information in the laboratory was “informal discussions on a
one-to-one basis ’’ with ~3’ of the interns and 5W~ of the supervisors in agree-ment . Only 3’- .; of both the intern and supervisor groups indicated that vs r it t en
memos or reports, or formal meetings were most effective.
F ifty-nine percent of the interns indicated that other scientists and engineers
from t heir laboratories were their major source of scientific or technical ~ torma-tion and 4W. ; of the supervisors felt that discussions among this group vs: ’~ themajor met hod of obtaining information. Tw enty-f ’our percent of the supervisors
t hought that discussions between laboratory members and scientist s , engineers
and educators from other activities was the major vs a~ of obtaining scientificinformation. hut only (~~- of the interns felt that this vs as their major source of
information.
Most of the supervisors (64~ felt that it’ t he intern assi gned to him had an idea
he thought would be useful to the laboratory, he would he most likely to discuss it
w ith his supervisor and only two supervisors said the intern would vs- rite a report
or implement the idea on his own authority.
Ohj t ’ehi t ’e ~. ro determine if there were identifiable harriers to the transf ’er of
technology between the interns and other members of the lahoratorv.
1 he majority of the interns (73~.;) and supervisors (60’>.;) either disagreed orstrongly disagreed that the paperwork requirements of their laboratories were
often unproductive.
Seventy-two percent of the interns and KX’~.; of the supervisors either agreed orstrongly agreed that the laboratory management encouraged its members to in-
corporate innovative ideas, Of 1 2 interns who disagreed that the laboratory en-
couraged innovation, nine were assigned to stable departments that had few
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changes in scientific personnel. Remarks made by interns during the personal
interviews showed some heliet’that older , well -established department s are not as
likely to encourage innovation its newer ones .
Fifty-five percent of the interns and ~~~ of the supervisors strongly agreed or
agreed that the laboratory gave individual recognition or financial revs ards to
members suggest ing new ideas. A much larger percentage of interns than super-
v isors (25~- vs . W~ ) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.
Most of the supervisors (70c.;) either agreed or strongly agreed t hat most of the
innovative ideas or techniques suggested by the interns were accepted by t he
laboratory. Oddly. t he interns who worked for two supervisors vs’ho strongl~disagreed that the laboratory accepted innovative ideas both said that all of their
suggestions were accepted.
There was no general consensus among either the interns or the supervisor as to
the primary reason that the laboratory did not adopt all of their innovative sugges-
t ions . The answer most frequently given what that they did not meet the labora-
tory ’s needs , with 24’~ of the interns and 30’>.; of the supervisors choosing thisanswer,
Sixty-one percent of the interns and 72’; of the supervisors felt that the restric-
t ions imposed on scientists and engineers in incorporating new ideas were minimal
or very reasonable. Only one supervisor felt the restrictions in his laboratory were
excessive.
Most of the interns (86’> ) agreed or strongly agreed that their supervisors had
an open door policy. There was only a moderate indication that those s ix interns
w ho disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement felt that their laboratories
were restrictive in incorporating new ideas , did not encourage innovation, or did
not give individual recognition.
Ohj ec th’e 9, To determine some of the characteristics of the interns
involved, Of particular interest are those characteristics associated with the
linker and stabilizer concepts described by Creighton. Jolly. and Den-
fling. ( Ref. 2).
Fifty-two percent of the interns and 62’~4 of the supervisors indicated that theinterns had supplied one or two original ideas for projects . Six percent of the
interns and one percent of the supervisors said the interns had provided five or
more original ideas.
Thirty-seven percent of the interns said they had recommended three or four
art icles to their colleagues . l5~ had not recommended any. and only one hadrecommended six or more.
Fifty-eight percent of the interns indicated that they regularly read up to six
journals . mag;~ ines . or newspapers. Forty-two percent read seven or more. Noneof the interns indicated that they did not regularly read at least one periodical.
Three times as many supervisors disagreed or strong ly disagreed that they went
to t he intern as a frequent source of information as those who agreed or strongly
agreed. The largest single grouping however was t he 44”.; who were undecided.
Seventy percent of the supervisors agreed or strongly agreed that most of the
ideas suggested by the interns were accepted by the laboratory while only 12’>.;
disagreed or strongly disagreed.
Objective /0.  To determine if specific intern characteristics were related to
t heir performance at the laboratory .
It was speculated that those interns having the strongest linker traits would
have different performance characteristics than those with stronger stabilizer
traits. In an ef iort to prove or disprove this supposition. intern questions which
were designed to measure linker-stabilizer traits were cross-tabulated with the
related supervisor questions which should give an indication of the interns ’ per-
formance. For this analys is , only those questionnaires that provided match-ups
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between interns and their individual supervisors were used. This resulted in a
substant ial reduction of the sample size of 31 intern-supervisor match-ups. The
results of ’ t his cross-tabulation showed no apparent relationship between perfor-
mance characteristics and linker-stabilizer traits.
Next , an ana lysis was performed by combining the scores on selected intern
questions and ranking the interns according to total score s obtained. The upper
group was des ignated as potential linkers , t he lower group as potential stabilizers .
and the indiscriminate middle group as neither potential linkers nor stabilizers.
The linker-stabilizer groups were then cross-tabulated against the same supervisor
questions listed in the preceding paragraph. Again, no apparent relationshi p
ex isted between the performance of characteristics and linker-stabilizer traits.
Va rious other combinations of cross-tabulations between intern questions de-
signed to measure linker-stabilizer traits and supervisor questions that indicated
intern performance all failed to produce any significant relationships between
t he tvso .
Analysis
The responses from the interns ’ and superv isors ’ quest ionnaires were recorded
on computer cards and analyzed by utilizing a set of computer programs called the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). These programs provided the
means to obtain a timely overview of the data received.
The SPSS program was used to provide cross-tabulations , to compute values of
c hi-square and to compute Pearson Produce-Moment Correlation Coefficients.
These three methods of comparing responses to various combinations of intern-
superv isor questions were used to identify relationships among the question
responses.
The cross-tabulations simply provided contingency tables which, although not
particularly useful by themselves , were the basis for the determination of chi-
square significance levels. The chi-square significance levels were in turn used to
measure t he degree of inter-dependence between the two questions being
compared.
Very few of the comparisons produced a significance figure of 5’>.; or less , which
was the risk level considered appropriate for this study. This result indicated that
t he response patterns for the two groups , interns and supervisors , were not inter-
dependent in general. That is . t he two groups tended to respond differently even
w hen asked identical questions.
The major areas in which their answers appeared to he inter-dependent were in
regard to the extent of laboratory restrictions , t he effect of the internships upon
the interns ’ technical transfer capability, and the propensity of the laboratory to
encourage innovation.
The number of chi-square comparisons made was limited to t hose matchups
t hat appeared to be particularly pertinent to the study.
Pearson’s correlations were computed for all possible combinations of intern-
supervisor questions in order to ascertain if there were any linear relationships
between the answers given by the interns and their supervisors. Those combina-
t ions that resulted in a correlation significance factor of 0.05 or less were
examined in greater detail in an effort to determine which specific factors were
related. Some of t he more significant relationships were summarized as follows:
I. The interns were more likely to feel that the program helped them to obtain
employment when their laboratories had relatively few restrictions.
2. If the interns thought the program increased their employment opportunity,
t he laboratory was likely to have encouraged and rewarded innovation , and
to have exercised few restrictions.
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~~. Where the interns tilt that the laboratory encouraged innovation, laboratory
restr ictions were apt to be minimal and most of the interns ’ ideas were
accepted hs their superviso rs.
4 . Interns who thought the laboratory rewarded innovation were judged by
their supervisors to become productive faster than others.
5. The interns who were assi gned to the more stable departments felt they had
a better advancement pattern than their contemporaries.
6. The interns w ho thought their supervisors had an open door policy took less
t ime to become productive, had most of their ideas accepted by the lahora-
tors . provided the laboratory with a specialized talent, had a better ad-
vancement pattern t han their contemporaries , and were considered by their
supervisors to have a greater degree of professional knowledge than their
contemporar ies.
Conclusions
I- ron) the outset , it was apparent that the large majority of interns were helped
by t he internship program. Over half of the interns remained with the laboratory
upo n completion of the internship and most of the others were either adequately
employed in their field of expertise or had returned to school. The internship
program also gave the laboratories a unique opportunity to evaluate the perform-
ilnce of t he interns inexpensively and with a minimum of contractual obligat ion.
Personal interv iews with supervisors and personnel managers resulted in a clear-
cut consensus t hat they felt the program had been really beneficial to them. In
most cases , t he supervisors would have gladly retained the interns assigned to
t hem under this program if funding and personnel ceilings had permitted.
A lthough the interns appeared to have provided the laboratories with technical
expert ise they could not have otherwise afforded, there seemed to he a tendency
for t he supervisors to view the interns ’ rote more as trainees or helpers than as
researc h specialists . Personal interviews with some of the supervisors revealed a
lack of complete knowledge of the objectives and ground rules of the program. In
one case , for instance, the supervisor was not notified in advance that an intern
was going to he assigned to him and was not advised of the purpose of the
ass ignment. While it is not known how widespread this lack of program knowl-
edge was , t here is some evidence that better communication throughout the
laboratories at the beginning of the program could have resulted in helter utiliza-
t ion of the interns ’ skills ,
t he ability to communicate and utilize concepts that are considered technologi-
cal advances has been discussed as a primary characteristic required of the pro-
gram part icipants. If this is so . then the technology transfer capabilities possessed
by t he interns should have been a considerable asset to the laboratories . A large
majority of the interns supplied at least one original idea for non-routine work-
related projects that were completed by the lahoratory, w ith many of them pros id-
ing several such ideas. Additionally, it was apparent that both the interns and their
supervisors thought that the intern ’s tec hnology transfer capability vs-as improved
during the internship period and this increased ability should prove even more
useful to them in future assignments .
An element that should he of considerable importance to laboratory managers is
the means by which technological information is exchanged among their scientit ic
wor k forces. In this case , one-to-one discussions between laboratory personnel
were by far considered the most effective means of exchanging such information.
Small informal group discussions nearly completed the number of methods that
laboratory personnel felt were effective devices for communicating technical in-
formation. Written reports and formal meetings were not considered h~ many to
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be the best means of accomp lishing this task. These conclusions result in the
requirement for laboratory manager~. to cons ider ways that technological informa-t ion can he effect ively distributed to more than one other person or to large
numbers of personnel. Perhaps one answer lies in the identification and more
deliberate planned use of his linker-oriented personnel.
Although there arc no set criteria for classifying individuals as linkers or
stabiliz ers, it w as possible during the study to identify interns within the sample
group t hat possessed relatively high degrees of linker or stabilizer tendencies.
From the previous conclusion , one might surmise that the laboratories would
have used these tw o  groupings of interns in different ways in order to make best
use of their respective talents in accomplishing the laboratories’ research and
development mission. There is. however , little evidence that the laboratories
formally recognized the characteristi cs described by the linker-stabilizer concept
and there did not appear to be any significant differences in the laboratories ’
ut ilization of these two groups .
I he supervisors ’ eva luations of the interns ’ performance also did not show any
significant differences between the linker and stabilizer oriented groups. One
assumption that perhaps comes too easily to mind when considering the linker-
stabilizer characteristics is t hat one group is likely to he superior to the other in
some of their performance or output traits. The results of t his study do not
support t hat assumpt ion however and one might speculate on the possible reasons
as follows:
I. The one-year performance period may not have been sufficient to allow the
discriminating traits to emerge , he recognized . and he utilized.
2. Performance is not evaluated on some unique. ahsolute scale , hut is more an
interpretation of the employees ’ performance as seen through their super-
v isors ’ eyes, i.e.. a supervisor with strong linker traits might value the same
trait.s in his employees more highly than a supervisor having different traits .
3. The study may not have adequately discriminated between linker-stabilizer
characteristics.
4 . The interns may not he a typical group in terms of linker-stabilizer charac-
ter istics .
5. The elapsed time since the termination of the internship program and the
study (ranging from one to two-and-a half years) tended to obscure the
superv isors ’ recollection of the interns ’ performance.
The possible existence of one or more of the above factors , or some ot her
unknown influencing factor, was not included in the scope of this study and
therefore was not investigated.
In general. there did not appear to he an excessive number of harriers in the
laboratories that would tend to discourage employees from submitting innovative
suggestions. There was some indication , however , that individual laboratories
that had specific types of harriers, suc h as lack of an open door policy by super-
vis ors , were less likely to receive and use innovative suggestions from the interns.
This trend was not strong enough to be considered conclusive.
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This paper descr ibes a method that has been developed to measure the ct ’kc-
t iveness of a technology transfer program , The method was used on an on-going
Navy program and showed that benefits to Navy users amounted to almost $3 for
every program dollar spent. Fhe method was developed by two Civil L-ng ineer ing
Corps officers . 1,CDR Jack Hendrickson and 1.1 Bill Fisher . and documented a’.
a Nasal Postgraduate School report in December 1974. It was their thes is kr the
degree of Master of Science in Management.
The technology transfe r program described in this paper was funded by the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC ) and executed by the Nasy ’s
Civil Engineering Laboratory ((‘El.) with the purpose of providing rapid response
service on short term requests for technological assistance from Navy shore
activities. The program is coordinated by C El’ s Facilities Engineering Support
Office (FESO).
It is also desirable to recognize some follow-on work by Professor Jolly who
was a thesis advisor for this study. He let me read a draft ofa related paper he was
preparing and some of my wording may sound familiar to him,
There have been var ious efforts to measure the effectiveness of the Assistance
Program. However, the need for a comprehensive method of quantifying benefits
of this program have persisted That need has now been sat isfied by the evaluation
method developed by Hendrickson and Fisher.
Outline
To set the stage , first some background on the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command. its R&D program and its Technology Transfer programs: Then some
background on the Civil Engineering Laboratory, its Facilities Engineering Sup-
port Office, and some details on the Assistance Program. This will he followed by
some co mments on the internal methods that have been used at CEL to evaluate
program progress. Then there will be a discussion of the approaches previously
used by the Naval Postgraduate School to evaluate the Assis tance Program. Next
will be presented the derivation of the evaluation model by Hendrickson and
Fisher. This will be followed by the application of the model to the FY74 program
data. Finally, the results of cost benefit analysis performed using the model will he
shown. By approachirtg the subject in this way, the plan is to give you a feeling for
the NAVFAC/CEL Assistance Program and the environment in which it func-
tions . With that background , t he discussions that follow on the development and
exercising of the evaluation model will be more meaningful and allow you to relate
these efforts to an effort or program that you might want to evaluate.
Organization and Mission
Figure 7— I depicts the big organization picture and the relationship of two ot’ the
main players . the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the Civil Engineer-
ing Laboratory. CEE. is under the administrative control of the Naval Construc-
tion Battalion Center at Port Hueneme. CEL is a detachment of the Center . hut in
R&D matters (‘EL operates in a somewhat autonomous manner making direct
contact with NAVFAC and others as necessary.
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command executes a program of Research,
Development. Test , and Evaluation for shore facilities, Adsanced Base and Am-
phibious Operations . Seafloor Structures , Environmental Control, and Energy
(‘onsers- ation. ‘rhe part that is of interest today is related to shore facilities.
NAVFAC’ s link to the shore facilities is primarily through their Engineering
Field Divisions , their Public Works Centers , the Public Works Departments of

















Figure 7—1 Command Orga nization. This diagram shows the relationship of the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), the Naval Construction Battal-
ion Center (CBC), and the Navy’s Civil Engineering Laboratory (CEL).
Officer in Charge of Construction (01CC) and Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction (ROICC). (See Figure 7—2 ). You will see and hear more about these
field organizations later.
The mission of the Civil Engineering Laboratory is a reflection of NAVFAC ’s
R&D mission: To act as the princi pal Navy RDT&E Center for shore and sea-
floor facilities support of Navy and Marine construction forces. The part that we
will be looking at is related to shore facilities because the purpose of the Assis-
tance Program is to provide assistance to shore activities. A major portion of the
NAVFAC R&D program effort is ass igned to the Civil Engineering Laboratory
in the form of specific research projects. Figure 7—3 shows a breakdown of the
FY1975 program by mission areas. About 6~ percent of what you see is funded byNAVFAC with the remainder coming from other Navy, DoD. and non-DoD
sponsors . A significant portion of the NAVE AC program accomplished at CEL
provides R&D results whic h benefit the Navy shore activities in efficiently and
effectively meeting their independent missicns. These would primarily be in the
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FIgure 7—2 NAVFAC Relationships for Facilities Matters. The links between the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) to the Engineering Field Divi-












SHORE & SEAFLOOR NAVY & ENERGY ENVIRONMENTAL
HARBOR FACILITIES MARINE CORPS CONSER - POLLUTION
FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION VATION ABATEMENT
FORCES
Figure 7—3 FundIng by Mission Areas FY 75 Energy and environment have become
Increasingly Important now amounting to about one-fifth of the CEL effort. Shore
and Harbor Facilities remain the first priority. 
- -- ---______ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _
At present. there are nine Naval officers , seven Navy enlisted and 300 civilians
working at (Ti.. Five of the nine officers serve in administrative and liaison
pos itions. The other four officers are involved in project work and the seven
enlisted personne l are all divers assigned to the diving locker. The 3(X) civilians
are sc ien:ists , engineers , and support personnel. The professional staff numbers
about 150 people. or about half of the civilian complement. and is highly qualified
in a large number of engineering and scientific fields. A tabulation of CEL disci-
plines is shown as Figure 7 .  This variety of disciplines makes our title of Civil
Engineering i.ahoratory somewhat of a misnomer. hut it ’s also what makes the
Assistance Progra m work. This breadth of knowledge coupled with the profes-
sional esperience of the staff makes a good combination for being responsive in a
‘.ar ietv of subject areas. The professional staff is of very high caliber. All hold











FIgure 7—4 Navy’s Civil Engineering Laboratory Discip lines. Even thoug h the name
and mission emphasize Civil Engineering, it is necessary and desirable for the labo-
ratory to have engineers and scientists that are qualified in a wide range of discip-
lines.
To round out the (‘El. picture . you need to know how we are organized and
where the Facilities l-ngineering Support Office fits into the organization. This is
shown in figure 7—5 . We have a military Officer-in-(’harge and Assistant Officer-
in-f harge and a ci’ . ilian Technical Director. A number of’ support offices service
t he professional staff wh :ch is di’. ided into four departments and offices displayed
along the bottom. I hesc ale the people who actually provide ass istance to people
in the field, the 1-ac ilit ies Engineering Support Office, the official title for the
tine-man liaison oflice. ~s located as a stafl to the Technical Director to have easy
access , to an~ part ofthe organi.’ation. The FFSO was estab lished in June 1971 toemphasize manageh.v~’t ‘ s desire to focus attention on the Assistance Program and
to ensure the I ahoratoi responsiveness to field needs. Its primary functions are :
I o act as a point of contact for liaIson w ith the field. To coordinate the Assistance
Program. lo identif’ . user needs and influence the on-going research program , and
b insure the application of ’ results . ‘I’he Ass is tance program is a NAV FA(’-
funded program operated by ( Fl.. The program has been operating since 1963 ,
hut ‘.sithout the locus and coordination that was provided starting in 197 1.
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FIgure 7—5 Internal Organization of the Navy ’s Civil Engineering Laboratory. The
Facilities Engineering Support Office (FESO) is shown as a staff function to support
the Technical Director. It serves as a Ila~son between the Field Engineering Offices ofN.-~%’F..U’ and the departments of the laboratory.
Assistance Program
Here is a brief summary of the Assistance Program and the part played by the
I’ FS() office. A man in the field with a problem or a need for information relating
to new mater ials , equi pment . tec hniques . and maintenance or construct ion proce-
dures requests -,issistance from t he l aboratory. i’he F’FS() prov ides the neces-
sa r% liaison and coordination to ensure that he gets a quick answer , at no cost.
because the program is prefunded by NAVFAC .  The Ass is tance Program in-
‘.o lves efforts to directly transfe r technology from its origin to its usage in re-
sponse to specific situations or problem areas that are brought to the attention of
the FF50 by potential users in the field. Action sta rts when someone in the field
makes a request t’or assist ance. This effort of ’ FESO is shown by Figure 7—6,
Another NAV FA (’ ‘I echnology Transfer program is called the RE)T&E Liaison
Program. This is shown schematically as Figure 7— 7. In each of the six EFDs . an
RD’r&E I iaison representative has the collateral job of providing liaison between
NAVI-AC and the field in the R&D area. They transmit to NAVFA(’  expre s-
sions of need for R&l) in specific areas based on field needs they see. I he~ alsopass the results of R&1) related to field problems . and needs . to people in the
field. These are the same field people that the Ass is tance program sci ” .es : The (i
I F Ds themselves , the 9 Public Works (‘enters , the Public Works Offices at 180
odd independent acti ’..ities and 83 NAVFA(’ construct ion offices . Both programs
are trying to help the same people. although in diffe rent wa y s . This results in a
multitude of communication channels .
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___________________ 
SERVICES UPON REQUEST AT
NO COST
Figure 7—6 Field Needs and FESO Action. The FESO acts as the liaison in terms of
assuring quick answers to f ield needs.
Evaluation of Assistance Program
As a pre lude to the evaluation work done by the Postgraduate School. Figure
7—8 ~z i ’ .es  some highlights of the Assistanc e Program as measured by ( ‘ El,. Since
t he I- aci l itIes Engineering Office was established in 197 1 . ‘.s e have been measuring
progress or usage h~’ two ma in parameters: Namely, t he number of requests ‘.sereceive for assistance and the number of act i s i t ies that request as’ stance.
Growth in usage of the As s istance Program has been encouraging h~ both mea-
surements.
‘[he subiects of these Assistance requests are as varied as the disciplines ot ’ our
professional stall. Figure 7—9 shows the subject area and the relative percentage
of importance for the F Y74 . The top subject area of paints , coatings and chemi-
ca ls has been consistently around 25”-; lar the last thre e years . The energy area
‘.s as a new entr~ for I’ Y 74. Almost half of the requests come from the Public
Works Offices. When we start ed keep ing track of the program, the hulk of the
requests ‘.~ere com ing from the Engineering Field I)ivisiuns , hut that trend re-versed se’.cra l years ago. Figure 7— 10 is a graph showing the number of’ requests
for assistance made to the Navy ’s (‘ El. by each of the act iv i t ies . The FESO
cla ims that it is easy to reach. i’ight at the other end of ’ t he telephone. In t’act . the
telep hone is equipped with a 24-hour answering service. [he telephone must he
sa t Is fa c to ry  for requesting technical assistance because 7(i percent of the requests
received last year were received by telephone.
A nat ural question at this point might he—How last is our quick response
service ” Our scorecard is shown on Figure 7 — f l .  Over hail of the requests i’e-
cei sed in fiscal year 1974 were satisf ied w ithin a ‘.‘.eek of receipt and a total of 75
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Figure 7—7 ‘s~~V FAC RDT&E Assistance and Liaison Programs. The Liaison activ-it~ forms a three way commun ication network that ties together the NAVFAC, TheNavy ’s (‘ El. and the Engineering Field activities.
react ion time when they think about a research laboratory. It is the way to assure
continued use of an assistance program.
What benefit is there in all of this for the user? The measures (‘El. normally
u ses speak to system usage and response time, Increased acti s i ty and rapid re-
sponse time are both good—hut they do not measure the benefit to the user . In
response to a NAVF’ AC desire ti.~ measure these benefits , and to measure themquantitati ve ly, the Naval Postgraduate School started looking at the .-\ssi stance
program in lM72. ,\n effectiveness questionnaire was developed and was corn-
pleted h~ t he El- D liaison representatives for the requests that originated from theFl’ l)s. The evaluation process was cont inued the nex t  ~.e ar f or  the t-’\ 73 ‘\ss is-
tance Program w ith  a slightly modified questionn~u ire w hich w~js again completedli~ t he Ft 1) liaison representatutes for the requests that came from their Fl- I).
F’. alui~uIior. of the returns Ii om these two years of evaluation yielded a ‘.ariet~ of ’
interesting s t at i s t ics  and trends . hut the most dramatic result w as the reali,ation
t hat .u better method of measurement of the benefit of this type of inl’ormation Was
necessar ~ ‘1 he esaluation ol
’ benefits using the questionnaires was too restr ict ise.
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Figure 7~$ Activity Requests by Year from Field Organizations. The trend towardmore use of the Navy ’s CEL is shown by the increase in the number of service
requests from t he field to the laboratory.
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FIgure 7—9 Subjects Covered by Requests. The requests for Informat ion originating
In the field and sent to the Navy’s CEL tend to cover a very w ide spectrum of
subjects.
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Figure 7—10 Source and Number of Requests Sent to FESO. The Public Works
Offices and the Engineering Field Division Offices together account for over 80% of
all requests for assistance sent to the Navy ’s Civil EngIneerIng Laboratory .
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Figure 7—I I Response Time to Requests for Assistance. The Navy ’s Civ il Engineer-
ing Laboratory has been able to respond to 57 percent of the requests received In
seven days or less.
It only permitted benefits to be classified into two main categories: Specific dollar
savings and intangibles. The net effect was that the intangible benefits were sev-
eral times largei than the benefits quantified in dollars . The intangible benefits.
which were not measured, far outweighed the measurable benefits to the point
that it was believed that the Assistance program benefits were not being accu-
rately measured. It made the need for a better method of measuring benefits even
more important.
Improved Measuring Methods
If the analysis were to have real meaning, the intangibles or unmeasui’ahle
category would have to he narrowed to a level where its uncertainty did not
overshadow the measurable category. Figure 7—1 2 depicts the objective of the
Hendrickson and Fisher study. One way that a more accurate measure of benefit
could be achieved was to extend the survey to include more of’ the field requests.
‘[he 1972 and 1973 su rveys were limited in scope. t he 85 and 104 requests sur-
seved in those years were from the Engineering Field Di’. isions only. This did not
give a representative sample of the total population. Figure 7— 13 shows the detail
of the sources of requests for ass istance.
Onl~ a small fraction ~~~ the requestors that completed the questionnaire werewill’ng to assign a dollar vaj ue to their use of the (‘El. assistance , In FY72 only 12
of the $5 requests surveyed . or 14 i 2 percent . gave dollar values . It was somewhat
better in fiscal year 73 when 30 percent gave dollar values. Even so. it was felt that
the true value of the benefits were not being evaluated by the questionnaires that
were being u sed. I-or the FY74 survey. Hendrickson and Fisher selected 295
requests for analysis , thus extending the survey to include all ot ’ the field requests.
A revised questionnaire was also developed. Again the FED liaison representa-
lives comp leted questionnaires for the requests that had come from the IF l)s .
Information on the remaining l’~
) requests from PWCs . PWOs . OIC( s . and
ROlCC~ were gathered via telephone by researchers at the Postgraduate School.
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Figure 7—12 Total Current Benefit FY—74. The Hendric kson and Fisher Study had
the objective to Increase the accuracy of’ the measurable benefits from ass istance
requests received by the Navy’s CEL.
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FIgure 7-13 Source of Requests and Number Surveyed. In FY— 12 and FY—73 the
survey was limited to the EFD’s. The term “Field” Includes bot h EFD’s, PWC’s,PWO’ s, OICC’s, and RO ICC’ s.
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The same questionnaire was used in obtaining information over the phone as was
used by the F E D  representatives.
Before the revised questionnaire was developed and used . Hendrickson and
Fisher did some deep thinking aix~ut w hy the last two surveys had not given thedesired information. One of the first things they recognized was that by looking at
current benefits they were only looking at part of the picture . There we ’e actually
two kinds of benefits: PRESENT AND FuTURE . The current benefit of the
Assistance Program is that realized by someone in the field as a result of the
assistance provided in response to their request . It was decided to limit the study
to current benefits as had been the case in the other two Postgraduate School
studies. However, in passing, some attention was focused on the fact that the
Assistance Program would produce future benefits. The primary benefit was
through this exposure to field problems. CEL’ s ongoing research program would
become more aligned to the real needs of field users. Thus common problems .
those faced by a number of Activities . would surface sooner and solutions to these
problems would become available at an earlier date to provide the basis for
improved efficiencies and performance.
Probably the most important thing to recognize was that objectively quantifying
the benefits of the CEL Assistance efforts would be highly subjective and lead to
varying results. For example. the benefit of a specific recommendation to solve a
particular problem can easily be quantified if it will reduce out of pocket expendi-
tures to achieve identical results. Quantifying benefits derived from one piece ot
information which is only part of the total information, required to arrive at a
decision, involves a greater degree of subjectivity. At the extreme end of the
scale, quantifying intangible benefits such as increased morale, safety and general
information would involve the most subjective measurements of all. In essence.
any attempt to quantify the benefit of information is necessaril y highly subjective
and recognition of this fact was an underlying consideration in the development of
a new approach.
New Approach
The major issue in evaluating the benefit from a technical recommendation was
to deve lop a categorization process. A system was needed that would provide an
organized method of testing to see whether or not a benefit resulted, and if a
benefit resulted , then to what extent the recommendation was responsible for the
final benefit. The categorization system developed for evaluating benefits looked
like Figure 7-14. The first thing to find out was whether or not the requestor
considered that the assistance he received was in any way beneficial. This infor-
mation was obtained by revising the questionnaire and placing this straightfor-
ward question at the head of the list.
Assuming that there was perceived benefit—the evaluation continued. The next
three steps in the categorization process looked into: ( I) The type of assistance or
—BENEFIT? YES OR NO
—TYPE OF INFORMATION
—% CONTRIBUTION TO DECISION
—PROBABILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION
—ESTIMABLE? YES OR NO
FIgure 7— 14 EvaluatIon of Benefits. The levels of categori zatIon are sh own. Each
request for assistance could he subjected to eva luation by determ ining the answers to
I he questions shown.
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information provided, (2 )  A determinatiu.n of t he percentage of contribution of the
recommendation to the final project decision, and (3) The likelihood that the
project would he implemented so that the assistance would actually produce a
benefit. The final steps in the process were to determine whether or not a specific
dollar benefit could he estimated and calculate the a’iual benefit.
The three central steps in the process will he discussed in a little more detail
before exposing you to the whole model.
1 ~FYPF OF INFORMATION
The evaluation with regard to the type of information was fairly stra ight-
forward . The choices were whether the information was general in nature , so as to
have no immediate value that could be identified, or whether the information was
spec ific to a project or use and therefore of current benefit.
(2 ) PERCENT CONTRIBUTION TO DECISION
The next stage in the evaluation process was to determine whether the specific
information was essentially comp lete and self-contained in terms of influencing a
decision to do something. or whether the information provided ‘.~as only part oft he total information used to arrive at a decision. In these cases where the infor-
mation was complete 100 percent credit for the henefit was allocated to the
Assistance Program. Where the information provided was used in conJu nction
with other information already available to the user , an information percentage
factor was used which varied between I and 99 percent. The factor v ’ .as deter-
mined on an individual case basis.
The assigning of these information percentage factors was recognized to be
subjective. and not wholly accurate , but certainly more correct than giving the
Ass istance Program 1 (K) percent credit for information which ~ as incorporated
with other information already known by the requestor.
(3) PROBABIlITY OF IMPLEMENTATION
This stage in the categorizaton processs involves the determination of the prob-
ability that the recommendation or information provided would be implemented.
Here , results that were considered beneficial were classified into one of the four
categor ies shown in Figure 7—I S. Probabilities were assigned to the last three
categor ies based on the experience of the investigators . The first category needs




PLAN TO IMPLEMENT 0.4 - 0.6 0.5
DELAYED PLAN (TEST) 0.2 - 0.4 0.3
DELAYED PLAN (STUDY) 0.1 - 0.3 0.2
Figure 7—IS Probability of Implementation. The assigned probab ility was based
upon the action plan. An implement ati on pian was assIgned a probability of 1.0
while a delayed study plan had a low probahlllt y of 0.2.
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Program. The least subjective category, where there was a definite plan to imple-
ment t he information. ~~as ass igned a probability of .5. It was felt that this esti-
mate could he inaccurate to the degree that figures could vary anywhere in the
range of .4 to .6. The last two categories involved “ifs”. The project would be
planned for implementation if test s proved successfu l, or in the last case , if studies
showed this to be the proper course of action. Probabilities of implementation
were determ ined in a similar manner to those for the planned projects. The subjec-
t ivity of the estimates increases and therefore the probability of implementation
decreases as you proceed from plans to test to study.
Model
Now that the basic parts of the model have been presented, it is logical to
present t he complete model. This is shown as Figure 7—16. Everything except the




GENERAL NI ORMAT ION SPECIFIC INFORMATION
EVALUATE
PARTIAL INFO COMPLETE INT O
FIL E FOR SOME EVALUATE
FUTURE USE
DETERMINE % ASSUME 100%
CONTRIBUTION CREDIT
IMP LEME NT DELAYED PLAN (STUDY )
ACT ION
SPECIE IC TUTURI PLAN DELAY ED PLAN (T E ST )
YE S NO Y ES NO Y ES NO YES NO
ESTIMABLE ESTIM A BLE ESTIMABLE EST IMABLE
3 4 5 5 7 8
I BENEFIT $ BENEFIT BENEFIT
EST~ ATE BENEFITDOLLAR BASED ON
BENEFIT INVTSTMEN T
Figure 7—16 Benefit I%aluatlon DecIsion Model. Starting at decision A, a series of
decisions are shown that make it possible to evaluate the dollar benefit of the answer
to a techn ical question supplied to an engineering org anization by a research labora-
tory.
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t he bottom rov~ where a YES indicates that a dollar estimate of benefit is possible.
That ’s t he odd numbers— I through 7. If the estimated savings were of the one
time type , the amount identified was used as the project benefit dollar base, lithe
est imated savings were of the reoccurring type , then the present value of the first
five years of savings was used as the project benefit dollar hase. The benefit
credited to t he Assistance Program in both cases was the project benefit dollar
base reduced as necessary by t he factor for information contribution and the
factor for implementation probability. The cases where NO indicates that a dollar
est imate of benefit is not possible. w hich are the even numbers from 2 through 8,
represent recommendations which did not result in specifically identified dollar
savi ngs. Ihese generally fell into areas w here the benefit was in the form of
improved operations , better morale, increased safety. improved quality. etc. In
the FY72 and FY73 surveys these benefits were left as unquantified intangibles
and they outweighed the measured benefits. but with the exception of information
~ hich fell into the general category that was not quantified. that would he number9 in the upper left area, each response to a request should have an identifiable
benefit even though it may not he readily quantifiable in terms of direct dollar
sav ings. Each response to a request could in some way be identified with an
implemented or proposed project , the magnitude of which was normally relativel y
easy to est imate.
In F\ 74.100 of the 295 requests evaluated fell into this inestimable category.
For these cases an additional factor, a benefit percentage factor , was applied as a
further reduction. The assumption accepted at this point is that in order to commit
funds to a project . a dec ision maker must, w hether he recognizes it or not , expect
a return in future benefit which is some percentage greater in present value than
t he initial outlay. This percentage would vary from decision maker to decis ion
maker. Even though the investment return would be expected to vary, it is as-
sumed that the quality of the decision maker who decides to implement a project
based on ~upplied technical information, would be such that the results of hisdecisions over the long run would yield a positive benefit. It appeared that a
reasonable value for this factor would be 0. I or 10 percent. This would be the
minimum return expected. For example , take the case of a modification to an
ex isting piece of equipment which would result in some unquantifiable benefit. In
this case , the project benefit dollar base would be the cost of the modification. The
benefit credited to the Assistance program would then be calculated by reducing
t he project benefit dollar base by the 10 percent benefit factor as well as hy the
necessary factors for information contribution and implementation probability -
o ne  of the most complicated examples would he the case where a piece of equip-
ment vs as due to be replaced and the information provided by CEI. caused the
i-eplacement to be accomplished through the procurement of a different type of
item which was more beneficial. Assuming the cost of the replacement item wa s
essentia lly t he same as the original. use of the total procurement cost as the
project benefit dollar base would be clearly inappropriate. On the other hand , use
of a zero benefit would be just as inappropriate. It is obvious that some value
between t hese two extremes is more accurate.
Each case like this was considered individually and a value for the project
magnitude. between t hese two values , was chosen subjectively considering to
w hat extent the non-dollar benefit of the new type procurement increased relative
to the total benefit which would have accrued by rep lacing the item in kind. The
pet-~entage increase in benefit was applied to the cost of the procurement and thatfigure used as the project benefit dollar base. Again, the benefit credited to the
Assistance Program was calculated by reducing the project benefit dollar base by
applying the 10 percent benefit factor as well as by the necessary factors for
information ~ontrihution and implementation probability.
76
Quantified Benefits FY 74
App lication ot the model to the 1974 survey data produced the benefits shown in
Figure 7—1 7 . Of the 29~ responses surveyed . 233 indicated that the requestorcons idered that he had ie~~ived beneficial information or assistance . That is 79
percent . a vcr ~ sati st~ irg number. There vsere 62 cases indicating that the requestsielded no beneficial information. However, among these were 40 cases in which
extraordinary circum stances indicated that the cases should not be included as
zero benefit requests . hut rather should he eliminated from the samp le for pur-
poses of cost benefit analysis . These are shown as not counted. That leaves only
22 cases vs here requestors said they did not receive any benefit.
MEAN













Figure 7—17 Quantified Benefits for FY—74 FESO Operation. Dollar benefits are
shown according to benefit code. The dollar benefits are calculated using the Benefit
Evaluation Model .
The remainder of the table shows the benefit code numbers which correspond
to the numbers we just talked aIx~ut on the model, the number of requests . and thetotal benefits calculated for each benefit code number using the factors previously
presented. Although three values for benefit were developed for each benefit
code. only the mean values are listed for clarity. Note that there are still 82
unquant ified requests in the general information category. Although the requestor
said he received benefit, no effort was made to establish dollar benefit value for
general information which may have been filed for future use.
Cumulative Benefits
A cumu lative plot of all the information developed is much easier to look at and
some interesting observations can be made. This is shown as Figure 7—18. The
curves graphically show that as the benefits ofa greater percentage of requests in
the sample are quantified. the total estimate of cumulative benefits becomes more
subject ive. The vertical distance between the HIGH and LOW curves at any
point on the horizontal scale represents the range within which the estimate s
could reasonably he expected to vary due to differing personal values of es-
timators and decision makers . The curves also tend to intuitively verify the appli-
cation of the model. The benefits from the highly intangible cases , like benefit
codes 7 and 8 are less than those from the tangible ones , like codes I and 2. as
indicated by the slope of the curves . Since the original objective was to quantify
benefits in terms that are easi ly understood and appreciated h~ management.
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FIgure 7—18 Assistance Benefits vs Number of Requests Ordered by Probability ofEstimate. This figure shows the curves of quantified benefits utili zing high , mean ,and low probabi lity of implementatio n. The slop e decreases and the range of accu-racy widens as greater numbers of requests in t he samp le are quanti fied.
Return
The benefits divided by t he costs gives the benefit per dollar spent. This is
shown in Figure 7—19. Very simply state d, for every dollar we spent on the
Ass istance Program in fiscal year 1974. some user in the shore facil ity community
realized S2 72 wort h of benefit.





Figure 7—19 Program Benefit to the Navy. When th e total dollar benefit for FY—74is divided by t he total program cost for FY-.74 it shows a benefi t to the Navy of $2.72for each doll ar spent.
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Benefit Trends
One more interesting thing that was done as part of the FY74 survey was to
take a backward look at the FY72 and FY73 data. The FY72 and FY73 benefits
vs crc c lassi fied as largely intangible and the intangibles were not measured. As
suc h they far outweighed 0e measurable benefits such that the Assistance Pro-
gram looked like a losing proposition, w hen intuitively this was not the case. A
backward look at benefit trends using the methodology developed by Hen-
drickson and Fisher produced different results. The nenefit trends for a three year
period are shown as Figure 7— 20. The first thing that should he noted is that
bene fits using the F Y74 survey methods are about 3 times larger than those using
the F Y72/73 survey methods. What this means is that the results in 72 and 73 were
understated at about one-third of their value. If you notice that the FY 74 dollar
benefit is much smaller than previously shown, it is because to do this trend
analysis certain extraordinary benefits were eliminated from the projections.
There vsa s one instance of a $150,000 saving in FY 73 and another in FY 74 that
amounted to almost $188 ,000 that were not included . Also these FY 74 benefit
figure~ were developed using an adjusted 40 percent sample to match the size of
t he samp le that vs as surveyed in 72 and 73.
210
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Figure 7—20 Assistance Benefit Trends (thousands of dollars). ‘F he bar grap h ~hos~st he Nais~ ’s (‘El. assIstance benefit using(I) estimates of the requestor s and t 2 t  usingest imates from the Benefit E~aIuation Decision Model.
Summary
1 his study has carried the costfbenefit analysis beyond the usual comparison of
numbers of requests . response t ime and estimates ot’ tangible benefits A benefit
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evaluatio n decision model vs as introduced that prov ided the means of categorizing
tec hnical information and recoinmendation~. I he model considers both tangibleand intangible benefits . After the technical information or recommendations are
categorized and a protect dollar benefit base assigned , the dollar benefit is ad-
just ed according to the percent of influence it had upon the project and the likeli-
hood that the pr~j ect wou ld he implemented.When the model ~ as used to evaluate ass istance responses over the last three
~eais a noticeable increase in benefits was apparent. ihe evaluat ion of the F \ 74
As s is tance Program showed a return of $2.72 for each doliar ‘spent.
Conclusion
This study demonstrated that it is possible to quantify meaningmully. in dollars.
a significant portion ot the benefits of technical information and assistance that are
often identified as intang ihIe~. This bene fit evaluation decision model should he as
usd ul in evaluating the benefits of technology transfer and utilization in other
organizations as it has been in the Navy ’s Civil Engineering l aboratory.
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Professor , Operations Research and
Administrative Sciences Department,
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
$1
It ’s a pleasure to be here this afternoon to be able to report on some research
t hat we think is very interesting and hopefully will have some long term benefits .
Before I become involved in the details of the research I do have some concerns
t hat I want to express. When one gets into the area of research that involves a
behavioral change and the measurement of organization performance it is cer-
ta inls appropriate that one proceed very cautiously. At this stage it is very earl y in
our researc h. Our findings have not been validated. In fact , our findings should be
cons idered tentative and unproven at this period in time.
This is the one paper presented today in which there has been no prior pub-
lished article, thesis , or report. This is mainly true because this research is in the
early stages.
In order to fully understand the research work that I wish to discuss it is
important that we have a common understanding of what is meant by technology
trans fer. Going back to Gilmore ’s (l 969)t definition as the reference point we find
t hat technology transfer is:
“—a purpos ive continuous effort to move technical devices , mater ial .
met hods , and/or information from the point of discovery or development to
new users. ”
One main emphasis that I like to place on technology transfe r is that it is a new
use of existing information. It is not important whether the idea is new , only that it
is new to the person adopting it. This is the important aspect.
Another main emphasis that I would like to place on technology transfer is that
we ana lyze what we are really trying to accomplish. To make myself clear . I
should like to go ~.ack to the definition of diffusion. This may give a worthwhileinsight. Diffusion is the historic unplanned movement of technological devices ,
mater ial, met hods, and/or informat ion from the point of discovery or development
to a new Liser .
In the case of diffusion there is no focused effort to cause the transfer function
to ta ke place.
It has been published in the literature , and many of you know , that the diffusion
process on t he average takes about 30 years. It is very slow. Stated in another
wi,y, only about 3’~ per year of new technology moves to secondary users unlesst here is purposive effort . Because of this there is a great need for us to do some-
t hing to speed up this process.
The third major emphasis that I would like to make concerning technology
transfer ts t hat it is a social process. This is illustrated in a statement by Havelock
(197 1 (: 2
“The transfer mechanism is not merel y a ser ies of communication channels
t hrough which information flows, It is a comp lex mechanism which involves
t he interaction of people. ”
This in flo way detracts from the necessity or importance of documentation or
distribution. It goes beyond documentation and distribution to the extent that
tec hnology transfe r is also a people oriented concept.
The objective of the research that I will present here is to attempt to measure
t he differences in performance between organizations that accept technology
movement and ut ilization simpl~ as a diffusion process as contrasted to organiza-t ions that make a purposive, conscious effort to commun icate and utilize
knowledge.
(,m lrinsu e. John S ‘ ‘The I nvuronment and this ’ .‘\s ’t ion of ‘I ec’ hnois mg~ I r:mnski : I 970—sit . ’ in 1 Report(if 1 1 ssnfcrcrtc ~ sponsored Itt Dens, en Rcseanch Insij ittic, t, nj s ci yj t~ ot I )efls ci c ,s ilctt Suust y s , ni sss ~\spe n. Sept. Ii, 28 . Wa shington. D.( - .  I)ept . sit ( ommeice N’ Il-2fs339 . 969 .
— I t .sscls 5L K - (~ ,, s ’ ~il  - / ‘/sis iiis , i~ bs i r  Ist ,, m , r,mt j ss ~ I / i ; s s is ~’/u 1) istm’ ,,tj nati sit  s/ ui!i:s iuis s sj of F’. its si t-s / ~’s Sui ts  Arbor . Michigan: Inst lis le t ’st i  Social Research, 1i uis .ersji i. of \Iich~giin. 1971
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Our de’s ire was to see if it was possible to differentiate between two organiza-
tions ss ith these different characteristics.
Earlier in the morning there was a presentation by Mr. Essoglou 5 that dealt with
the ‘linker concept. ’ It was interesting that the results he reported indicated that in
fact there is very little difference in the distribution of the number of linkers or the
number of st ahit i,ers in any large organization. With this in mind. one wonders if
it is possible to identify differences in characteristics between large organizations
that might he effective in terms of technology transfer and those that might be
relativel y ineffect ive,
This study is intended to evaluate this organization difference. The presentation
of the research study will he ordered as follows:
I. A review of the factors that are important in enhancing technology transfer.
2. A disc tss ion about the development of the instrument for measurement of
t he selected characteristics of an organization.
3, A discussion of the results of the measurements.
4 . A summary and interpretation.
I wilt he able to go through the model of technology transfer . Figure 8—1 . very
rapidly. You remember that Mr. Essoglou 4 used this model in his discussion. He
ta lked about the transfer mechanism and the concept of movement of technology
from the source to the user. This model was developed first by studying the
literature. The literature search gave us a relatively long list of factors that are
important in terms of enhancing the movement of technology from the source to
t he user . The large list was then distilled by using a modified Delphi process to
arrive at the nine factors that you see in the model. Because of time limitations it
would not he desirable to spend very much time ta lking about each element of the
model, hut in order to understand the research that I am going to discuss , some
appreciation of the definition and scope of each of the nine factors is important.
Factor I. The method of information documen:ation. Documentation deals
vs ith how the technical information is recorded and presented. Information
documentation can he rated by considering the format used, how the material is
organiied and the complexit y of the language. It us also necessary and desirable to
design the documentation s u ch that it is retat i s CI ) easy to  index and/or include in
tec hnical searc h systems.
Factor 2. Distribution. The distribution as considered for this model is the
physical c hannel through which technology flows. It involves both the number of
entries and c isc of access as well as the formal distribution plan. Distribution of
technical information includes format distribution lists , publications in journals .
presentations at symposia and conferences , and person-to-person exchange.
Factor 3. Organization. This is the receivers perception of his formal organiza-
lion. When try ing to evaluate the formal organization. in terms of its influence on
the utilization of technical information , it i’, useful to consider the int i ’ i- ’:’ructure
elements such as the power structure , t he nature of the business , t he ma :..gement
sty le. the resources available, the attitudes of management . t he amount of
bureaucratic tendency and the st~hiliIy of the organization.Factor 4. Project. ibis factor refers to the users input to the selection of
researc h and development projects. I-or effective research utilii rtion , the client
or potent ial client should huve an open communication channel to the researcher.
[he client or potent ial user shouht have some influence on the selection and
I ssogti si t . St I N s t  ml I- ic it uses I rigs neessn g ( isnirn.snct . ‘ ‘ I he I inkei lA ss ie in the I echnolog~I rsn sk ’ s Prmsc ess - - t’rsseee s ti ng’i itris’ !ing ssn 1 echnology Ii snstcr I’roiects . Nat at \I.mte ru s! (‘ stin-
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The modet may be expressed in equation form such that:
L, \ i,1C1 ti2C2 . . tl~Ci~Where
L Linker ndex for an orginizatron
ii~ A measure of factor utilization , is~ range 0—. 1C, A measure of the factor contribution . ~ Ck 1
Figure 8—I Predictive Mod e ‘-‘ Technology Transfer. The linki ng mechanism
necessary to achieu.e efTect i%. - ‘ . - .uology transfer is described by identifying the
factors that cont ribute to mo~cment of technology from the source of knowledge(supp lier ) to the utilization of knowl ed ge (user/recei ver ).
approval of projects. In particular. potential user monitoring and consulting can
he important in determining future utilization of the researc h output.
Factor S. Capacity. The capacity of the user to utilize new and/or innovative
ideas covers a wide spectrum of traits including venturesomeness , wea lth, power .
educat ion, ex perience. age. self-confidence, and cosmopo litaness . These traits
are measurab le and their relative strengths can reveal the potential capacity of an
individual w ithin a user organization to utilize available technology.
Factor 6. l inker. ‘The concept is that a person . referred to here as a linker.
operates as a coup ling device between the source and user of available knowl-
ed ge. The concept , as described here , is that a linker (person) functioning within
the user ’s organization would exhibit identifying traits and characteristic s similar
Jo those of the gate-keeper , opinion leader , innovator , and ear ly knower of an




the perceived reliability and accuracy of both the source and the channel through
which the information flows. The extent of uts e and the rate of adopting research
output correlates with the credibility of the available technology.
Factor 8. Reward . Reward , as referred to in the model, is the perceived and
actual recognition of innovative behavior in the social system of which the indi-
vidual is a member. Reward can be considered to he divided into two broad
categories . The first category is intrinsic to the work itself. Examples of intrinsic
reward are the opportunity to use skills , to gain new knowledge, to deal with
challenging problems and to have t’reedom to folIos’. up ones own ideas. The
second category deals with extrinsic reward . Extrinsic reward is related to salary.
administrative authority, association with top executives and ~imilar benefits.Both intrinsic reward and extrinsic reward are important in influencing the utiliza-
tion of new and/or innovative knowledge.
Factor 9. Willingness. Awareness , even first hand knowledge of a new and/or
innovative idea, is not sufficient to assure its use. There must be a willingness and
interest (or perhaps a better descri ption is an internal motivation) to utilize a
better method, process or concept. Willingness is a very personal element , yet it is
often a critical point in the transfer and utilization mechanism.
Although this introduction to the nine elements of the technology transfer
model , of necessity. has been brief, it does provide a foundation for the discussion
that will follow.
What has been done then is to use the theoretical material that has been dis-
cussed as a means to look at an organization. The objective is to find out how an
organization performs in terms of each of the nine factor areas of the model.
In order to get at the problem, several organizations that were similar in that
they had a large number of graduate civil engineers were selected to be studied.
The organizations were : Two public works centers of the Navy: one Naval Re-
search activity: a department of the State of California: a large private engineering
company: a consulting engineering group, and five field engineering divisions of
the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. This gave a total of eleven organiza-
lions.
The selection of the organizations was intended to provide some data from the
Federal sector and some data from the private sector. Each of these organizations
us made up of a large number of prot’essional type people most of whom are
graduate civil engineers.
A point to make at this time is that it is much too early in the study for it to
reveal specifically which organizations are either good or bad. In fact , the onI)
person that would he considered eligible to receive the scores would he the direc-
tor or commander ofan activity. For this reason the activities are simply identified
by number.
The instrument was designed around the model using Thurston differential type
question construction. Each factor of the model was considered separately. Five
questions were developed to measure the level of presence of a factor in the






METHOD OF INFORMATION DOCUMENTATION
TECHNICAL AND/OR TRADE JOURNALS OFTEN HAVE USE- ~FUL IDEAS ABOUT PROCESSES OR PRODU CTS THAT
ENGINEERS CAN PUT TO PRACTICAL USE. 1 2 3 4 5
ItS
The respondent had the option of indicating: strongly agree. agree. no opinion.
disagree. and strongly disagree.




EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS: a
FACTOR#2
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
COLLEAGUES WHO ATTEND PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS ~USUALLY PREPARE A REPORT OUTLINING THE NEW U) ‘C Z 0 C/)
INNOVATIONS THAT THEY SAW OR HEARD ABOUT. 1 2 3 4 5
One last example is from the group of five questions to evaluate the factor







FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE USER
MANAGEMENT ENCOURAGES INTER-DEPARTMENTAL ~
COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE AT ALL ECHELONS IN (I) ‘C Z 0 Ci)
SOLVING PROBLEMS. 1 2 3 4 5
This methodology was applied to all nine factors. This then resulted in nine
factors times five questions each or 45 quest ions in total. The questionnaire was
designed to be relatively short and easy to read.
Nine of the eleven organizations were large enough to have over 200 profes-
sional employees. For these organizations the sample was about 200. The re-
sponse was about S0~
T w o  of the organizations were much smaller. The sample size was 50 with a
StY ? response of about 25.
The analys is technique that seemed most reasonable to us was the median chi
square . The median for each factor w is determined for the combined sample
population of the eleven organizations. This established the reference standard .
Then each factor of each of the eleven organizations was tested against the me-
dian using chi square analysis. If the test of a factor against the reference gave a
c hi square value of 3. 84 or larger then it was considered significantly different at
the 95” , level. For this discussion the critical value was therefore 3.84. This is
summarized as:
ANALYSIS TECHNIQU E
MEDIAN CHI SQUARE TEST
CHI SQUARE VALUES EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN 3.84 SHOW A SIG-
NIFIC ANT DIFFERENCE FROM THE MEDIAN OF ALL ACTIVITY (D.F. -1 ,
0.95=3.84)
PLUS VALUES INDICATE A DIFFERENCE IN A FAVORABLE DIRECTION,
NEGATIVE VALUES INDICATE A DIFFERENCE IN AN UNFAVORABLE
DIRECTION.
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Figure 8—2 is intended to show the most dramatic results from the study. The
nine factors are listed on the abscissa. Activity # 10 is the organization with the
largest number of positive chi square values greater than 3.84. In contrast Activity






1. DOCU +31.737 —7.205
2. DIST +11.032 —6.514
3. ORGA + 5.813 —7.170
4. PROJ — 0.224 —5 .761
5. CAPA — 3.062 —0.123
6. LINK + 5.706 —12.173
7. CRED — 0.427 —0.190
8. REW D + 0.085 —2.593
9. WILL + 0.558 —4.417
Figure 8—2 Organization Response. This chart shows the median chi square values
for the activity with the most factors with chi square values significantly positive and
the activ ity with the most factors that are significantly negat ive. Details of the chi
square ca lculations are discussed in the caption to Figure 3.
Analysis would tend to support the argument that Activity #10 was performing
very well in such factor areas as documentation, distribution, organ izat ion , and
linker performance. In contrast Activity #3 appeared to have low performance in
t he factor areas of documentation , distribution , organization, project selection ,
linker performance, and willingness to accept new ideas.
What does high or low performance mean? At that point it is a value judgment
on our part because we have not demonstrated the validity of the test. However , it
wou ld appear to us that organizations that are more effective in terms of their
tec hnology transfe r accomplishments will tend to have higher positive chi square
numbers.
Some of the organizations that were selected were those that we believed were
super ior and some were those that we believed were inferior in terms of their
effectiveness at technology transfer. Our intuitive judgement was supported by
t he chi square tests.
One of the things that we have not done is to establish a weight or coefficient for
eac h of the factors .
You can see in Figure 8—3 that each of the factors is considered separately. We
have no reason to believe that they should or should not have an equal weight in
terms of their effect on the technology transfer capability of the organization.
We would like to do additional researc h in order to determine just how impor-
tant eac h of the factors are . How important is reward? How important is credibili-
ty? It is our strong feeling that these factors may he of different importance in
different organizations depending upon organizational objectives.
In other words , we need to assign a coefficient to each of the factors in order to
reflect its importance in an organization. It is our hope that the coefficients will he
a constant for any spec ific sector of the economy. i.e.. private research, govern-
ment researc h, private engineer ing etc.
We have not attempted to add the factors together at this point in time. Because
of this , we do not have a s ingle index number that can he used as a grade or
eva luation score for an organization.
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Figure 8—3 is the total picture of the study, AU eleven organizations are shown.
Note that Activity # 1 is very close to the median for all factors.
Activity #3 is the one that was shown in Figure #2 with the large number of
negat ive chi square values.
Activity # 10 is the organization with the largest number of factors with positive
c hi square values.
Another consideration that we have examined and that we wonder about is the
objective of the organization. Activity # 10 is profit motivated as contrasted to a
pr ivate or government research laboratory. This may be important and may tend
to tefl us something about the high positive chi square scores.
In review , we have taken the factors of the model and developed an instrument
w hich attempts to measure each of the factors. We then administered the instru-
ment to eleven different organizations.
In analyzing the data we have found a difference between the organizations. We
have evaluated these differences in terms of the median chi square test. We found
t hat there were significant differences between some of the factors. Some organi-
zat ions have several factors that are positive and significant and some organiza-
t ions have several factors that are negative and significant when the median chi
square test is applied.
This tends to lead us to the feeling that it may be possible to identify (using the
technique) organizations that are high performers in terms of technology transfer
and those which are low performers.
One might postulate beyond this state that it conceivably could be true that
certain actions could be taken to change the behavior of the individuals within the
organization so that the organization would be more efficient.
I think when you get into the area of behavior changing you should think about
the work reported by Dr. Dave Lingwood.5
Perhaps the most vulnerable aspect of this research is that we do not have a
reference standard . A reference standard is needed in order to make the best use
of these data. This will he the objective of future study.
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